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Abstract
Patents represent a quid pro quo between the public and the inventor: in exchange for 
disclosing the invention, the inventor receives the right to exclude others from practicing her 
invention.  They therefore serve as a source technical information. Patents also communicate 
information to markets and companies that serve to reduce various transaction costs, allowing 
more efficient transactions and investment.  Patents consequently communicate various types of 
information beyond the technical.
There is no reason, however, that such messages must be limited to the technical or the 
pecuniary.  This Article explores whether patents, like other governmental acts such as 
legislation, can create expressive harms.  The grant of a patent could communicate a message of 
inferiority to groups whose identity is tied to their biology.  The Article analyzes this potential 
through the paradigm of granting patents on a “gay gene” or other biological process that 
predisposes a person towards a homosexual orientation.  Other conditions implicated by my 
thesis are the deaf, dwarfs, and high-functioning autistics.  These groups do not regard 
themselves as pathological or in need of “curing,” yet genetic discoveries offer the potential for 
their elimination through what is effectively privatized eugenics.  The grant of a patent on such 
technologies affords the government’s imprimatur of such controversial technologies.  
The article first reviews scientific status of homosexuality and then explores whether 
patents regarding sexual orientation could a moral signal of inferiority by the government by 
suggesting gays and lesbians are pathological.  Finally, the article offers various prescriptions 
to address this problem.
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3What may be considered normal for one individual may be decidedly 
abnormal for another; and who is there among us who can decide 
which of the two is normal and which abnormal?1
I. INTRODUCTION
Patents traditionally have been justified on the basis of incentives.  Commentators have 
justified patent law on three different incentive systems: quid pro quo, ex ante, and prospect 
theories.  Under the quid pro quo view, the patent acts as an incentive for the innovator to 
disclose the invention to the public in exchange for the patent’s exclusive rights.2  On the most 
basic level, the patent disclosure communicates a message to the public about what the inventor 
has discovered and how to make and use that discovery.3  According to the ex ante incentive 
view, patents are needed to combat the public good problem of information: without patents, 
competitors could free ride on the invention and compete with the innovator without incurring 
the research and development costs.4  Such free riding reduces the ex ante incentive to invest in 
innovation.  The third view, prospect theory, contends that patents create the incentive to 
commercialize the invention after the patent has issued.5  By defining the property right 
1 Abraham L. Wolbarst, Sexual perversions: their medical and social implications, 134 
MEDICAL J. AND RECORD 5, 5 (1931) (quoted in ERIN G. CARLSTON, “A Finer Differentiation”: 
Female Homosexuality and the American Medical Community, 1926-1940, in SCIENCE AND 
HOMOSEXUALITIES 175, 184 (ed. Vernon A. Rosario) (1997)).
2 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. --- (forthcoming 
2006).
3 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2005).  For a general discussion of disclosure obligations, and various 
structural flaws in the system that mitigate the patent system’s ability to serve as a source of 
technical information, see Holbrook, supra 2, at ---.  
4 Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004); see also Holbrook, supra note 2, at ---.
5 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 
265, 266 (1977).
4surrounding the invention, the inventor can best coordinate later commercialization of the good 
in a way akin to prospecting of mineral rights.6
Recent scholarship has persuasively challenged these paradigmatic views and has 
demonstrated that patents perform functions far different than providing these basic incentives.  
Patents can operate as a vehicle for transmitting messages. For example, patents can serve as a 
signal to markets about aspects of the firm.  A robust patent portfolio can send a signal to the 
market about the nature of a firm’s innovation capacity or other factors relevant to potential 
investors.7 The patent thus acts as an intermediary, translating otherwise complicated 
information into a simpler form to allow the markets to operate more efficiently.  Patents 
communicate other information in order to reduce transaction costs:  they can facilitate 
affirmative asset partitioning by firms and combat “team production” problems arising in efforts 
by firms to develop and exploit information assets.8  Patents consequently serve a far greater 
communicative effect then simply communicating the technical information regarding the 
invention and the scope of the exclusionary rights.  
This reality is not surprising.  Property rights often involve issues of communication, 
messages, and symbols.9  The need for notice of property rights among parties necessitates that 
there be a common language of communication and expression of who owns the rights and what 
6 Id.
7 See R. Polk Wagner and Gideon Parchomovsky, Patent Portfolios, U. PENN. L. REV. 1 
(2005); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002).
8 Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473,480-99 
(2005).  
9 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 610 
(1988) (discussing how property rules implicate community communications); Carol M. Rose, 
Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 83-85 (1985) [hereinafter, Rose, 
Possession].
5those rights are.10 Property rights are more than simply the ability to exclude others.  The 
messages and signals are necessary elements of any functioning property system.
Patents therefore undeniably act in ways to facilitate signals and communication beyond 
there simple disclosure.  A patent differs from other forms of property in a significant way: they 
are granted by the US government after a substantive review of an application for the right to 
exclude.  An inventor must demonstrate that she has satisfied the patentability requirements11
and is thus entitled to a patent, which the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
confirms by issuing the patent.  The fact that the patent is a grant of a right by the government 
enhances the signals of the patent document.  The government’s imprimatur help convey the 
signal with greater clarity and confidence.  The patent has credibility behind it because of the 
government’s imprimatur.12
There is no reason that these signals are limited to technical and pecuniary 
considerations.  The message in the patent also can involve the contents of the invention 
contained within it.  The government imprimatur attending the patent grant can confirm the 
legitimacy of a technology.13 In particular, the genetic revolution has resulted in discoveries 
linking genes, proteins, and other biological processes to human behavior generally.14 Research 
10 Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1105, 1108 (2003); Rose, Possession, supra note 9, at 84-85.
11 The PTO will grant a patent if the invention is of eligible subject matter, has utility, is 
novel and is nonobvious.  35 U.S.C. § §101, 102, 103.  The inventor’s application also must 
adequately disclose the invention.  35 U.S.C. § 112.  
12 Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in 
Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2004); Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, 
and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 676 (2004).
13 Lee, supra note 12, at 676.
14 DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, LIVING WITH OUR GENES 301 (1998) (“What often 
goes unsaid is that genes being discovered also include ones that define behavior.  Virtually 
every aspect of how we act and feel that has been studied in twins shows genetic influence, and 
many of the individual genes have been isolated.”) [hereinafter HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING]; 
6into biological causes of behaviors is inevitable and, indeed, has already begun.15 Recent 
discoveries include genes that influence aggressiveness,16 weight,17 intelligence, 18 novelty 
seeking, worry19 and harm avoidance.20  One scientist has noted that “[t]he real breakthroughs in 
understanding personality are not occurring on leather couches but in laboratories.”21  Another 
has suggested that “[t]he genetic analysis of behavior will prove to be . . . the most important 
advance in the behavioral sciences in [his] lifetime.”22 Many of these discoveries are patentable. 
While patents relating to genetically-based diseases are desirable, patents on genes and 
processes that influence behaviors, activities, or conditions that are not clearly harmful could be 
problematic.23 These discoveries may result in the ability to manipulate or choose preferential 
traits, a form of privatized eugenics.24  The PTO inevitably will be grant patents on biological 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
313, 320 (1992).  
15 FRANCES FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE 24 (2002) (“But it seems almost 
inevitable that we will know much more about genetic causation [of behaviors] even if we never 
fully understand how behavior is formed.”); DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF 
DESIRE 187 (1994) (“The discovery of a genetic link to homosexuality is bound to be followed 
by discoveries of links to other aspects of personality.”) [hereinafter HAMER & COPELAND, 
DESIRE].
16 See, e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 5,418,162; U.S. Pat. No. 6,165,716.
17 HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 14, at 9.
18 Id.  at 10.
19 Id. at 11.
20 Id. at 55.
21 Id. at 25.
22 RICHARD C. PILLARD, The Search for a Genetic Influence on Sexual Orientation, in 
SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 226, 237 (ed. Vernon A. Rosario) (1997).
23 Admittedly, what constitutes a “disease” is infected with the public’s view of 
undesirability.  SIMON LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE 213-14 (1996) (“[V]alues are intrinsic to the 
definition of disease.  Most especially, it has been claimed that a key feature of a disease is its 
undesirability, although opinions differ as to by whom and for whom . . . the disease is judged 
undesirable.”)  [hereinafter LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE].
24 See generally Sarah M. Markwood, Comment, Creating a Perfect Human is Not So 
Perfect: The Case For Restricting Genetic Enhancement Research, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 473
(2005).
7discoveries with such eugenic potential.  This begs the question of whether we want the patent 
system to create an incentive for these types of discoveries.  
Moreover, the imprimatur of the patent grant can express the view that such technologies 
are legitimate and normatively good. Patents are awarded only for inventions that are useful.  
Utility, however, is a relative concept: what is good for one could be destructive to another.  This 
concern is particularly acute for groups whose identities are tied to their biological state or 
behaviors: the invention could be used to destroy these groups by “curing” them or by preventing 
their birth through prenatal screening.  The grant of patents on these technologies confirms that 
the government views them favorably, and could express that these groups are highly disfavored, 
further marginalizing them.
Such expressive dimension of intellectual property has been explored previously in 
trademark law25 but not in patent law.  The Lanham Act proscribes granting federal trademark 
registration for a mark that is immoral or scandalous.26  Denying registration does not require the 
applicant to stop using the mark and therefore does not preclude use of the mark.  Instead, denial 
merely creates a disincentive for the owner to continue using the mark due to the lack of 
protection.  The only reason for denying the trademark registration in this context, therefore, is 
25 Copyright, arguably the intellectual property right most closely associated with 
expression, ironically does not encounter these types of problems.  For one, at least in the United 
States, copyright must coincide with the First Amendment.  Denial of copyright protection based 
on expressive content could violate free speech protections.  Second, and more importantly from 
an expressive perspective, copyrights are further removed from state action because the 
copyright is created the instant the original work is created.  While a copyright can be registered 
with the Copyright Office, such registration is not required for the grant of the copyright.  The 
government need not review the work to determine whether it satisfies the conditions of 
originality.  Given this distance from governmental action, the idea that a copyright could convey 
an expressive message with respect to governmental views of a group is not well founded.  
26 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
8the potential that the government would be viewed as approving of such a scandalous mark.27
The concern of the government sending the wrong message is purely an expressive 
consideration.28
This Article argues that patents also possess the potential to express governmental 
preferences for, disfavor towards, or even condemnation of various members of society.  The 
recent discoveries into human biology portend discoveries that relate to various conditions that 
are central to a person’s identity.  The deaf, for example, do not view their condition as a 
pathological condition in need of curing: to them, they are simply a language minority.  Similar 
concerns have been expressed others, such as high-functioning autistics and little people.  Patents 
27 Although the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has denied that registration can act as 
providing government imprimatur, see In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 
1220 n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (rejecting as erroneous the “concern that the issuance of a trademark 
registration for applicant's mark amounts to the awarding of the U.S. Government's ‘imprimatur’ 
to the mark”), it has provided no other policy or theoretical justification for this exclusion.  The 
lack of a justification begs the question of why the “immoral” or “scandalous” restriction is in 
the Lanham Act.  The TTAB has hidden behind its role of applying the statutory requirements 
but does not explain why the requirements, as a policy matter, are there in the first place.  The 
legislative history suggests that Congress wanted to discourage the use of such marks.  Hearings 
on 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 18 (1939) (hereinafter Hearings) (statement of Rep. Thomas E. Robertson); see also
Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and the Doctrine of Disparagement: How 
Politically Correct Must A Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 22 (1994).
Denying registration, though, does not prevent a marks use. Thus, the only conceivable basis is 
to avoid giving the “stamp of approval” of an immoral or scandalous through the granting of a 
federal right.  Cf. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE AND MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR 
COMPETITION LAW & POLICY at 331 (2004).
28 For a discussion of trademark law’s implications for the queer community, see generally 
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and The Disparaging: 
Section 2(a) Trademark Law after Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
L. REV. 187, 191 (2005).
9on discoveries related to such conditions would communicate the message that “curing”29 these 
people would be normatively good, further marginalizing these groups.
A particular group whose trait is increasingly shown to be biologically related has already 
borne the brunt societal and expressive marginalization: gays and lesbians.  Recent scientific 
studies have demonstrated that homosexuality is undoubtedly influenced by biology, even if it is 
not biologically determined in all cases.30  A likely result of such research into the origins of 
sexual orientation would be methods to “cure” gays and lesbians.31  An even more likely 
scenario would be a pre-natal screen that would identify the likelihood that the fetus will be gay, 
permitting termination of the pregnancy32 or perhaps consumption of some sort of pill to reduce 
the likelihood of bearing a gay child.33
As such, the quest to find the “gay gene” or other biological origins of homosexuality has 
potential for the patent to express moral condemnation of gays and lesbians.  Although a patent 
29 I place the word cure in quotation because, to these groups, it is condescending.  I use the 
term merely for rhetorical force to demonstrate the stigmatization such language can cause these 
groups.
30 See, e.g., Brian S. Mustanski, et. al., A genomewide scan of male sexual orientation, 116 
HUM. GENETICS 272, 272-73 (2005).
31 As Dean Hamer notes humorously: “Another danger is that we will medicalize normal 
human behavior and variations.. . . What about that pesky gay gene?  Spray it away with new 
‘Straight-in-a-Day!’”  HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 34, at 35, 40-42.
32 Id. at 85  (“Hanging over the entire field of genetics has been the specter of eugenics –
that is, the deliberate breeding of people for certain selected heritable traits.”); ROSARIO , supra 
note 48, at 6 ([T]he classification of homosexuality as abnormal or pathological does not exist in 
an essential way within its examination by scientists, but is constructed from a complex 
interaction of social values and individual researchers’ and subjects’ approaches, methods, and 
presuppositions.”); LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 67, at 171 (“On the one hand, this search 
[for a gay gene], if successful, seems to promise the most direct support for a liberating ‘born 
that way’ argument.  On the other hand, it raises what is invariably described as the ‘specter of 
Nazi eugenics’ – the possibility that attempts will be made to eliminate homosexuality through 
genetic ‘therapy,’ through the selective destruction of fetuses that carry ‘gay genes,’ or through 
sterilization of gay adults.”).
33 FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 39-40.
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relating to sexual orientation or the alteration of such orientation has yet to issue, at least one 
researcher in this field has confirmed his intent to pursue patent protection such a discovery.34
This Article will explore the potential for patents to perform a social signaling function, 
apart from the market-signal articulated in portfolio theory.  I contend that patents communicate 
information that is relevant not only in a technical or  pecuniary sense but also in a normative 
one.  Central to this signaling is the utility doctrine, which delineates the inventions that are 
socially beneficial and thus worthy of patent protection.   I explore these contentions using the 
paradigm of sexual orientation because it is pregnant with issues of morality and the potential for 
expressive consequences.  Granting patents on genes related to sexual orientation, and potentially 
other conditions such as deafness, high-functioning autism, or dwarfism, communicates 
government approval that these groups are pathological and should be cured.  Such a 
communication expressively harms these groups.  This line of argument contributes an additional 
basis to criticize granting certain patents in areas relating to human biology and genetics.35
34 Dean Hamer has stated that he plans to use the rights to exclude others from using the 
discovery in a way harmful to others.  DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, LIVING WITH OUR 
GENES 219 (1998)  (“I would try to use the law to withhold the ‘testing’ technology should it 
ever become available.  Genetic testing as practiced in the United States requires 
commercialization, and commercialization generally requires protection of intellectual property 
through patents.  If a lab does discover a ‘gay gene,’ it might be able to control the licensing of 
the technology.”); see also GARLAND E. ALLEN, The Double-Edged Sword of Genetic 
Determinism: Social and Political Agendas in Genetic Studies of Homosexuality, 1940-1994, in 
SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 227 (ed. Vernon A. Rosario) (1997) (“[Hamer] also vowed to 
patent his genetic testing techniques to insure that they could not be used in a discriminatory 
way.”).  
35 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation: The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (May 1998); Jordan Paradise, Lori 
Andrews, and Timothy Holbrook, Patents on Human Genes—An Analysis of Scope and Claims,  
307 SCIENCE 1566 (March 11, 2005); Bagley, supra note 12; Jonathan Kahn, What’s the Use? 
Law and Authority in Patenting Human Genetic Material, 14 STAN. L. & POL. R. 417, 423 
(2003); Joshua C. Benson, Note, Resuscitating the Patent Utility Requirement, Again: a Return 
to Brenner v. Manson, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 267, 270 (2002); MARGARET DAVIES AND NGAIRE 
NAFFINE, ARE PERSONS PROPERTY? 155-56 (2002) 56 (“Indigenous people and third-world 
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In Part II of this article, I detail the biology of human sexual orientation, demonstrating 
that patents in this area are inevitable.  Part III examines more rigorously the way in which a 
patent could signal condemnation of these various biologically-influenced groups.  Part IV will 
then explore various prescriptions for dealing with this expressive harm.  
II. THE BIOLOGY OF HOMOSEXUALITY
Homosexuality is undeniably in the moral margins of society.  Although attitudes have 
shifted over the years, with ever increasing acceptance in today’s society, a substantial portion of 
the U.S. population still views homosexuality as immoral, often due to religious beliefs.36 As 
recently as 1974, homosexuality was viewed as a psychological pathology in need of treatment.
  More recently, however, gays and lesbians have obtained greater acceptance socially 
and legally. Homosexuality is no longer considered a disease, and psychological treatments to 
change sexual orientation have been condemned by the medical establishment as ineffective and 
potentially harmful. 37 Legally, states and localities are affording gays and lesbians far more 
activists around the world have reacted strongly against sampling and patenting specifically 
directed at their regional genetic characteristics, arguing that it is an act of ‘bio-piracy’ and a 
violation of cultural self-determination.’”); Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over 
Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument 
for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1667 (2001).
These previous critiques differ from the one articulated in this Article.  My argument is 
that, as a grant of property by the government, patents on inventions that relate to the identity of 
certain groups could inflict harm on that group by suggesting they are less-deserving or should 
be “cured.”  The difference is subtle – previous criticisms, particularly based on identity, have 
condemned gene patents for affording property rights over what is quintessentially something 
that helps provide identity.  My argument is that the government’s role, by granting patents, in 
fact suggests a preference for or against certain groups that are closely associated with that 
characteristic.  My argument would apply not only to genes but also to other biological processes 
that help determine personality or non-pathological behaviors.  In this article, I do not argue that 
patenting of all genes, particularly those relating to diseases, is inappropriate.  
36 See Julian W. Slowinski, Therapeutic Dilemmas: Solving Sexual Difficulties in the 
Context of Religion, 26 J. OF SEX ED. AND THERAPY 272, 278 (2001).  
37 ROBERT ALAN BROOKEY, REINVENTING THE MALE HOMOSEXUAL: THE RHETORIC AND 
POWER OF THE GAY GENE 37 (2002); HUBERT KENNEDY, Karl Heinrich Ulrichs: First Theorist 
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legal protections than in the past.  Many localities afford domestic partner benefits to same-sex 
couples, and some states have begun to offer civil unions that afford rights equivalent to those of 
married couples.38   Massachusetts legalized same-sex marriage itself.39  Even the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s view of gays and lesbians has shifted dramatically.40  The expressive dimension to these 
decisions is expressly noted in the opinions.41
Notwithstanding such progress, homosexuality in the United States remains a topic of 
considerable moral debate.  Many religions condemn homosexual conduct as immoral and view 
homosexuals as “disordered.”42  Members of Congress have proposed a constitutional 
amendment to prohibit state and local governments from affording marriage rights to same-sex 
couples.43 A primary argument used by those opposed to gay rights is that homosexuality is a 
chosen lifestyle.  In response to this argument, the gay rights movement has argued that 
of Homosexuality, in SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 26, 39 (ed. Vernon A. Rosario) (1997); 
LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 211.
38 Baker v. Vermont, 170 Vt. 194 (1999); Connecticut began recognizing civil unions on 
October 1, 2005.  See William Yardley, Connecticut Approves Civil Unions for Gays, N.Y. 
TIMES at B5 (April 21, 2005).  
39 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003).
40 In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Court held unconstitutional on equal 
protection grounds an amendment to the Colorado constitution that prohibited any arm of the 
state from extending legal protection to gays and lesbians.  Id. at 635.  In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003), the Court found held sodomy laws unconstitutional as a violation of due 
process, overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  In surprisingly strong language, 
the Court noted that “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
41 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“[Bowers] continuance as precedent demeans the lives of 
homosexual persons.”); Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (The Colorado amendment “classifie[d] 
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone 
else.”).
42 See generally ALICE OGDEN BELLIS & TERRY L. HUFFORD, SCIENCE, SCRIPTURE, AND 
HOMOSEXUALITY  13 (2002).  See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 2357-59 
(2005) (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P85.HTM) (last visited March 2, 2005).  The 
43 See, e.g., See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Gay marriage ban rejected, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 
Nov. 19, 2003, at 1; Evelyn Nieves, Family Values Groups Gear Up For Battle Over Gay 
Marriage, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 17, 2003, at A6, also available in 2003 WL 5651316.
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homosexuality is not a choice.  To bolster this argument, advocates suggest that – be it nature or 
nurture – there is no volition in deciding that one is gay or lesbian.  
Due in part to this debate, scientists have performed numerous investigations into the 
biological44 cause of homosexuality. Sexual orientation, even biologically speaking, is a 
complex characteristic; finding a single cause is highly unlikely.45 Sexual orientation is most 
likely influenced by a number of biological factors.46 Overall, a person likely possesses 
biologically determined disposition toward a certain sexual orientation, which is resistant to 
alteration.47
This section reviews the studies exploring the biology of sexual orientation.  These 
investigations confirm that sexual orientation is strongly influenced by biology, even if the 
particular mechanisms are presently unknown.48 Four categories of studies have demonstrated 
44 When I refer to “biological” causes of homosexuality, I include both genetic, heritable 
causes and congenital causes, such as hormone levels in the uterus or relative placement of a 
fetus in the uterus. Such factors would be distinct from post- birth interactions with the 
environment, such as parental influence.  One possible exception could be if, for example, 
something in a mother’s milk transferred hormones to the child, impacting the child’s sexual 
orientation.  At this time, no such evidence exists but, because the impact would result from a 
physical exposure – hormone levels – I would also consider this to be biological even though it 
occurs after birth.
45 HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 14, at 198 (“We do not expect to find a gene 
that is the same in every gay man – we already know that sexual orientation is more complex 
than that—just one that is correlated to sexual orientation.”); Ronald Kotulak, Homosexuality 
may be issue of brain chemistry, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 13, 2003, at 22 (“’I don’t think 
homosexuality can easily be conceptualized as just one thing – a phenomenon that is due to one 
particular developmental pathway.’” (quoting Feino F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg, a Columbia 
University professor of clinical psychology)).
46 Mustanski, supra note 30, at 273 (“Given the complexity of sexual orientation, numerous 
genes are likely to be involved. . . .”); PILLARD, supra note 22, at 230.
47 Id. at 233.
48 I use “environmental” to refer to non-biological influences.  This is in contrast to a 
geneticist, who would view, for example, variations in intrauterine conditions as 
“environmental.”  See Vernon A. Rosario, Homosexual Bio-Histories: Genetic Nostalgias and 
the Quest for Paternity, in SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 1, 4 (ed. Vernon A. Rosario) 
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this influence: twin studies, physical differences in the brain, the identification of the location of 
a potential gay gene, and the birth-order phenomenon.49
A. Twin Studies Demonstrate Genetic Influence on Sexual Orientation
The classic method for assessing the genetic influence on a trait is to study monozygotic, 
or identical, twins separated at birth.  Because these siblings have an identical genetic makeup 
but do not share the same environment, such studies can mitigate the impact of environmental 
influences on the expression of a given trait.50 For sexual orientation studies, however, such data 
are not readily available.51 Instead the studies have focused on the differences between 
monozygotic (identical) twins, dizygotic (fraternal) twins, and siblings.52  If a trait is genetically 
linked, then monozygotic twins will more likely share the trait, whereas dizygotic twins will 
possess the trait at the same ratio as a non-twin sibling.53 and.  If the trait is influenced by 
intrauterine factors, then dizygotic twins will share the trait more frequently than non-twin 
siblings.54
(1997)). Thus, I eschew the geneticist definition, focusing on potential biological sources of 
homosexuality.  See supra note 44.
49 These studies exclusively deal with gay men and not with lesbians.  Little is known about 
the origins of lesbianism.  See, e.g., Edward M. Miller, Homosexuality, Birth Order, and 
Evolution: Toward an Equilibrium Reproductive Economics of Homosexuality, 29 ARCHIVES OF 
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 1, 14 (2000); Domonick J. Wegesin, A Neuropsychologic Profile of 
Homosexual and Heterosexual Men and Women, 27 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 91, 92 
(1998). 
50 See BELLS AND HUFFORD, supra note 42, at 29; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, 
at 177; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 177.
51 Gay identical twins that have been reared separately have been studied, but the numbers 
are too small to have any statistical significant.  Id. at 178.
52 Id. 25-30.
53 PILLARD, supra note 22, at  234.  Adoptive siblings will share the trait at same rate as the 
population as a whole.  Id.
54 Id. at 234.
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Numerous twin studies have been performed with respect to homosexuality.55 Some of 
the earliest studies evaluating the inheritability of homosexuality involved the use of twins.56
The study performed by J. Michael Bailey and Richard Pillard found that in 52% of the cases, if 
one monozygotic twin was gay, then the other also was.57  The rates for fraternal twin brothers 
was 22%.58  The concordance rate for adopted brothers was only 11%.59 Thus, while not entirely 
determined by genetics,60 homosexuality does have a strong genetic component.  A concordance 
rate of less than 100% does not mean there is no genetic component to homosexuality or that 
homosexuality arises strictly due to environmental forces.61  For other anatomical and 
biochemical conditions, concordance rates can be less than 100% due to other biological 
mechanisms coming into play.62  The gay gene may simply be inactive in the unaffected 
sibling.63 Numerous other twin studies have performed that confirm a genetic influence.64
Regardless, “[t]here is no room for doubt that homosexuality is highly heritable.”65
55 See MATT RIDLEY, GENOME 117 (1999) (“A dozen other studies came to a similar 
conclusion [that a gene or genes contribute to homosexuality].”); LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra 
note 23, at 173-78.  
56 BELLS AND HUFFORD, supra note 42, at 26.
57 J. Michael Bailey and Richard Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation, 48 
ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 1092 (1991).
58 Id.
59 ALLEN supra note 34, at 252.
60 An exclusively genetic trait would have a concordance rate of 100%.  BELLS AND 
HUFFORD, supra note 42, at 26.
61 See William J. Turner, Homosexuality, Type 1: An Xq28 Phenomenon, 24 ARCHIVES OF 
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 109, 125-26 (1995).
62 Id.; HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 14, at 188.  Studies suggest, however, that 
shared parental environment has almost no impact on sexual orientation.  HAMER & COPELAND, 
LIVING, supra note 14, at 188 (“In the most careful twin study to date, the best mathematical 
estimate for the shared environmental component of variance was 0 percent.”).
63 Turner, supra note 61, at 126.
64 See Mustanski, supra note 30, at 273; B ELLS AND HUFFORD, supra note 42, at 27-28; 
LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 175-77.
65 RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 117; see also LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 177.  
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B. The Gay Brain – Variations in the Hypothalamus
In addition to twin studies, researchers have explored whether there could be physical 
differences between gays and straights that might suggest a biological origin to sexual 
orientation.  A natural place to look for such physiological differences would be the brain given 
that sexual attraction and arousal is strongly rooted there.  Of particular importance is the 
hypothalamus, the part of the brain from which sexual desire originates.66 Researcher Simon 
LeVay discovered that the size of the hypothalamus differs between homosexual heterosexual 
men.67 Prior research showed that the hypothalamus of men and women differ in size in a 
statistically significant way.68 In LeVay’s study, he found that, on average, the gay men’s 
hypothalamus were two to three times smaller than heterosexual men’s and were the same size as 
women’s.69  Such a finding suggests that the neuronal mechanisms in the brain that regulate 
sexual behavior may differ physically between gay and straight men.70  This result is consistent 
with studies on cognitive differences between gays and straights71 and with studies done on 
animals demonstrating same-sex attraction. 72 Subsequent studies also have shown variations in 
66 See STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 89 
(2002).
67 SIMON LEVAY, THE SEXUAL BRAIN 120 (1993) [hereinafter LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN].
68 LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 67, at 120.  The hypothalamus is a tiny region at the 
base of the brain.  LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 130.   LeVay specifically studied 
the INAH 3 region, which is sexually dimorphic.  LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 67, at 120.  
For convenience, I will refer generally to the hypothalamus.  
69 LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 67, at 121; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, 
at 143.
70 LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 67, at 121.  LeVay considered alternative possible 
causes for the size difference, such as whether AIDS had changed the size of the hypothalamuses 
of the gay men.  He concludes that AIDS was not the cause of the difference, but recognizes that 
using AIDS victims risks a sampling bias.  Id.
71 Wegesin, supra note 49, at 94.
72 LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 199.  Homosexual acts have been observed in 
a variety of animals.  Id. at 197; see also Larry Thompson, Search for a Gay Gene, TIME 60-61 
(June 12, 1995) (homosexuality in fruit flies).  Homosexual conduct is “widely distributed in the 
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the brain structures of gays and straights.73  These differences in brain structure could be a result 
genetic or hormonal influence on the development of the brain.
There is a “chicken-and-egg” problem to these studies.  The brain is a dynamic organ 
that changes over time.  As such, environmental factors – such as engaging in different sexual 
behaviors – could change the shape of the hypothalamus or program it to react to certain 
stimuli.74  So, these results beg the question of whether the brain differences influenced sexual 
orientation or whether sexual orientation influenced the changes in the brain.75 Regardless, there 
is considerable scientific evidence that the physical structure of the brain plays a significant role 
in sexual orientation.
C. The “Gay Gene” Marker
One possibility for the physical differences between gay and straight brains is that a gene 
or genes could influence development of the brain.  If there is such a genetic link, then 
homosexuality should run in families.76  In fact, it does – both gay men and lesbians have a 
animal kingdom.”  PAUL R. EHRLICH, HUMAN NATURES 195 (2000).  Hypothalamus differences 
have been found in rams as well.  Ronald Kotulak, Homosexuality may be issue of brain 
chemistry, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 13, 2003, at 22.
73 Miller, supra note 49, at 13.  In a study of the reaction to men to male-derived chemicals, 
the homosexual men in the study responded in the same manner as straight women, with 
activation of the hypothalamus, whereas heterosexual men showed no response.  See Ivanka 
Savic, et. al, Brain response to putative pheromones in homosexual men, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES 7356, 7356 (May 17, 2005).
74 See, e.g., BELLS AND HUFFORD, supra note 42, at 36; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 
23, at 144 ([T]here is always at least the theoretical possibility that the structural differences are 
actually the result of differences in sexual behavior.” (emphasis in original)).  
75 See Savic et al., supra note 73, at 7361 (noting causation of hormone response could be 
hypothalamus differentiation, acquired sensitization through stimuli, or association with scent to 
sex); ROSARIO, supra note 48, at 5 (“[A] larger INAH 3 might be either one of the causes of male 
heterosexuality, or the by-product of a heterosexual lifestyle choice.”); LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, 
supra note 67, at 122.
76 PILLARD, supra note 22, at 233.
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greater likelihood having gay or lesbian siblings.77 Researcher Dean Hamer recognized this 
reality, resulting in perhaps the most startling – and controversial – scientific study into the 
biological cause of homosexuality: he identified a link between a known genetic marker on the X
chromosome and homosexuality, suggesting a gene influencing sexual orientation may be at that 
location.  
Hamer had noted that the maternal branches of his subjects contained a disproportionate 
number of homosexual family members.78  If a characteristic seems to be passed to a son by the 
mother and not the father, then it likely is controlled by a gene on the X chromosome.  
Recognizing the likelihood that homosexuality could be a sex-linked trait, Hamer performed a 
linkage study on his subjects79 and found a statistically significant link between a known marker, 
Xq28, and the trait of male homosexuality.80 The study concluded that the “linkage results 
[were] statistically significant at a confidence level of >99 percent.”81
77 Id. at 227; Sven Bocklandt, et. al., Extreme skewing of X chromosome inactivation in 
mothers of homosexual men, 118 HUM. GENETICS 691, 691 (2006); Mustanski, supra note 30, at 
273.
78 HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 14, at 190; HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, 
supra  note 15, at 93-94.
79 HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, supra note 15, at 120-133. A linkage study does not 
identify a gene for a given trait but instead shows a statistical relationship between a stretch of 
DNA and a trait.  PILLARD, supra note 22, at 235.  Specifically, such studies examine the 
statistical probability that there is a gene associated with a phenotypic trait on a chromosome at a 
known location, the marker.  The linkage is demonstrated through the use of markers, which are 
genes or gene fragment that are known on a given chromosome.  These markers act as road signs 
because, on a single chromosome, genes generally stay together because chromosomes generally 
do not split themselves into pieces during meiotic cell division.  Genes located on the same 
chromosome are generally inherited together.  So, if there is a gay gene on the X chromosome, it 
will almost always be beside a given marker.  The linkage study examined whether the gay 
members of a family share a marker that the straight members did not.  If such a correlation 
exists, then the trait – homosexuality – may have a genetic component located near that marker.  
See generally HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, supra note 15, at 113.
80 HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, supra note 15, at 121.  By chance, brothers would 
normally have a 50% chance of sharing the markers; Hamer found that 83%  of the gay brothers 
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Although some have disputed this linkage,82 Hamer subsequently confirmed his results.83
Other studies have also suggested a genetic influence arising from the X chromosome.84  More 
recent investigations have expanded the search for genes influencing orientation beyond the X 
chromosome and have identified three new regions where potential “gay genes” may be 
located.85  Thus, researchers are likely to find genes that influence sexual orientation, discoveries 
that would be eligible for patent protection.  Minimally, the quest continues in earnest.  
D. Male Birth Order Phenomenon Suggests Congenital Cause
Genes may not be the only biological trigger for homosexuality.  Recent studies have also 
demonstrated a potential congenital cause for male homosexuality.  The more sons that a woman 
had matching variants, while the control of random pairs of brothers satisfied the expected 50% 
rate.  ALLEN, supra note 34, at 253.
81 Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male 
Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321 (July 16, 1993) (as reprinted in HAMER & COPELAND, 
DESIRE, supra note 15, at App. A).  Importantly, the study did not find a gay gene.  It merely 
found an association between homosexuality and a location on the X chromosome.
82 A group of researchers at the University of Western Ontario failed to find any markers 
linked to homosexuality.  LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 184-85.  Importantly, these 
results were not published in a peer-reviewed journal.  Mustanski, supra note 30, at 273.  
Moreover,  the methodology of that study renders its findings ambiguous as to the impact of 
Xq28 on homosexuality because the study looked at paternal relatives, not maternal.  HAMER & 
COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 14, at 197.
83 BELLS AND HUFFORD, supra note 42, at 25; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 
183-84; Mustanski, supra note 30, at 273.
84 Turner, supra note 61, at 121, 125. A recent study found that mothers of gay men tend to 
have more offspring.  This study provides further support for a genetic predisposition for 
homosexuality and also offers a theory to resolve the Darwinian paradox – that a gene for 
homosexuality should die out because it does not encourage propagation of the gene. Andrea 
Camperio-Ciani, et al., Evidence for maternally inherited factors favoring male homosexuality 
and promoting female fecundity, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
04PB0377.1, 04PB0377.3 (published on-line 2004); see also Study links genes, male 
homosexuality, www.cnn.com (Oct. 13, 2004) (“‘The key factor is that these genes both 
influence homosexuality in men, higher fecundity in females and are in the maternal and not the 
paternal line.’” (quoting Andrea Camperio-Ciani)) (available at 
www.cnn.com/2004/tech/science/10/13/homosexuality.study.reut/ndex.html) (last visited Oct. 
19, 2004).
85 Mustanski, supra note 30, at 276.
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has, the increased likelihood that the subsequent son will be gay.86  So, younger brothers are 
more likely to be gay than their older brothers.  Interestingly, the presence of sisters is irrelevant, 
resulting in a fraternal birth order effect.87  While anecdotally, many gay men have noted that 
they and many of their friends are the youngest in the family, the studies show that there is more 
to this phenomenon than simple coincidence.  Each additional older brother increases the 
likelihood of homosexuality by about one-third,88  and the phenomenon has been documented 
not only in the United States but also in Britain, the Netherlands, and Canada.89
Scientists have yet to demonstrate the process resulting in the birth-order effect, although 
they have posited various theories.  Hormone levels, or the fetuses susceptibility to hormones, 
could influence sexual orientation.90 A woman could build up a “resistance” to the male fetus, 
creating more female hormones.91  These hormones may interfere with the determination of the 
cells and brain structures that result in a heterosexual child.92 If the hormones act to prevent 
masculinization of the developing fetus – or allow effeminization – the result could be changes 
86 See David W. Purcell et al., Birth Order in a Contemporary Sample of Gay Men, 29 
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 349, 352-53 (2000); RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 118 (“A man 
with one or more elder brothers is more likely to be gay than a man with no siblings, only 
younger siblings, or with one or more elder sisters.”); Ray Blanchard and Anthony F. Bogaert, 
Birth Order in Homosexual v. Heterosexual Sex Offenders Against Children, Pubescents, and 
Adults¸27 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 595, 595-96 (1998).
87 Purcell, supra note 86, at 350; RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 118.
88 RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 118.
89 Id.
90 FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 37.
91 Purcell et al., supra note 86, at 354; Blanchard and Bogaert, supra note 87, at 602 (both 
suggesting the fraternal birth order phenomenon “reflects the progressive immunization of some 
mothers to Y-linked minor histocompatibility antigens (H-Y antigen) by each succeeding male 
fetus, and the concomitantly increasing effects of H-Y antibodies on the sexual differentiation of 
the brain in each succeeding male fetus.”).  
92 Blanchard and Bogaert, supra note 87, at 602.  Ridley notes that the H-Y gene is similar 
to a gene that encodes the anti-Mullerian hormone, responsible for causing the regression of the 
Mullerian ducts in a male embryo.  RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 119.  These ducts are the 
precursors to the uterus and Fallopian tubes and, thus, their regression is essential for the 
development of a male embryo.  RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 119.
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in the sexual differentiation of the brain.93  Finally, there could be a genetic component as well, 
such as genes that influence how the fetus interacts with the intrauterine hormones.94
All of these biological investigations demonstrate that sexual orientation is influenced by 
biological mechanisms.  Patents on these discoveries therefore are highly likely, if not inevitable.  
III. THE POTENTIAL FOR EXPRESSIVE HARMS FROM PATENTS
Important with respect to all of these investigations is that science is not exempt from 
biases.95 The framing of their investigations reveal a subtle yet pervasive bias.  If the search was 
truly objective, the search would be for “sexual orientation,” but all of the investigations are 
looking for the cause of homosexuality.  By distinguishing homosexuality, inherently they 
suggest that homosexuality (or any variant from heterosexuality) is outside the norm.  
Notwithstanding the seemingly pro-gay discussion, the science remains inherently hetero-centric, 
which has significant consequences for the potential expressive impact patents on these 
93 RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 119 (“If so, the effect of a strong immune reaction against 
these proteins from the mother would be partly to prevent the masculinisation of the brain, but 
not that of the genitals.”); Blanchard and Bogaert, supra note 87, at 602; LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, 
supra note 67, at 123
94 Miller, supra note 49, at 6.  (“Such genes might change the level of hormones during 
prenatal critical periods, or the receptor density, or the level of enzymes that convert one steroid 
to another, or the level of binding proteins, or the permeability of the blood-brain barrier to 
hormones. . . .just enumerating some of the possible pathways makes it plausible that multiple 
genes could be involved.”); LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 125.  Miller suggests that 
the birth order effect would have reproductive advantages because later-born, more feminized 
sons would “reduce[] the probability of these sons engaging in unproductive competition with 
each other.”  Id. at 30.
The recent study on the fecundity of mothers also supports these various hypotheses.  In 
order for the birth-order phenomenon to take place, necessarily a given female must have a fair 
number of off-spring.  The link between male homosexuality and increased female fecundity 
further supports the “immunization view.” 
95 Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 14, at 339 (“But the image of neutrality . . .is largely a 
myth. . . .Defining what is ‘natural,’ science is readily appropriated as a way to conform 
individuals to institutional values and existing social or political conventions.”).  
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processes may have.  These studies, however, also risk further marginalizing gays and lesbians 
by looking them as biologically flawed and in need of being “cured.”  A similar situation is faced 
by other groups who may not view themselves as being pathological or in need of curing, such as 
the deaf, dwarfs, and high-functioning autistics.  Patents related to these technologies would 
confirm the legitimacy of such technology through the government’s imprimatur, signaling 
governmental approval of efforts to cure these groups.  The patent system is thus directly 
implicated in these technologies and fostering an incentive to create eugenic technologies that 
will be in the hands of private parties.  
A. What Are Expressive Harms?
Expressive theories of law are concerned with the way in which government action can 
communicate a specific belief or attitude of the state, such as hostility to racial or ethnic groups 
or religion.96  Under this view, laws can shape or reinforce social norms and also inflict harms to 
members of society.97  Indeed, it is beyond cavil that “the linguistic meaning of governmental 
action can have a moral impact.”98  Laws can be examined normatively by assessing how they 
96 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1506 (2000) [hereinafter Anderson & Pildes, Expressive 
I].
97 Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
669, 670 (2003).
98 Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1363, 1494 (2000).  Within the academic literature, there has been a debate over what 
constitutes “expressivism” and whether such a theory can justify certain laws.  Compare id. at 
1364 with Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96.  Both of these camps, however, 
recognize that government acts can have expressive impacts.  See Matthew D. Adler, Meaning, 
Nonlinguistic "Expression," and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply Response  To 
Professors Anderson And Pildes, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1577 (2000).  I am not suggesting 
that patent law is justified by expressive theory.  Instead, I am exploring the proposition that both 
sides agree could occur: the grant of a patent, a form of government communication, can express 
disfavor or hostility towards certain members of society.
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express certain intentions and attitudes.99  Racial segregation, for example, communicates that 
blacks are inferior to whites and that whites must be protected against blacks.100  The expressive 
harm occurs regardless of whether the target – here blacks – believe or accept the message; so 
long as they understand the message communicated, the harm arises.101  What is important is the 
“social, or symbolic, meaning” of certain laws or other acts by the state.102
Specifically, “[e]xpressive theories of action tell us to express certain attitudes 
adequately, [the standard for which] is not met simply by intending to express those attitudes, or 
by thinking that one’s actions do express those attitudes.  There need not be an intent to 
communicate a certain message for there to be expressive harms.[103]  Rather, the standard of 
adequacy is public, set by objective criteria for determining the meaning of action.”104  Thus, 
somewhat surprisingly, the intentions of an actor are not the only factors relevant in assessing the 
expressive impact those acts.105 The expressive harm can arise when people understand the 
message communicated, even if they may not agree with the message.106
Expressive considerations help explain “why the consequences matter, and which 
consequences matter,” both of which are important because these impacts occur to people, not 
99 Rosen, supra note 97, at 669-70; Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 
1508.
100 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, No. 03-636, 2005 WL 415281, at *5 (S. Ct. Feb. 23, 
2005) (“Racial classifications raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious purpose. 
Thus, we have admonished time and again that, "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry into the 
justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining ... what 
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial 
politics.”); see also Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1528.
101 Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1528.
102 Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 40-41 
(2002).
103 Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 185.  Anderson and Pildes note that 
“communicative acts are only a small subset of all expressive acts.”  Id.  
104 Id. at 1512.
105 Id. at 1513.
106 Id. at 1545.
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simply abstract institutions.107  Any interpretation of the impact of course will depend on the 
context of the communication.108  A person will suffer an expressive harm when “she is treated 
according to principles that express negative or inappropriate attitudes towards her.”109  Under 
expressive theories, “state action should be wrong . . . when it expresses impermissible 
valuations, without regard to further concerns about its cultural or material consequences.”110
The acts of the state can thus send a signal what the norms of a society ought to be.111
Law can impact the views of individuals about which behaviors are approved or disapproved by 
society as whole,112 resulting in an actor understanding how others will view her behavior.113
The state can act as a collective to express certain views, even if those views differ from those of 
individual legislators.114  The legislative process also can affect attitudes expressively by 
revealing new information to society regarding a given subject.115  Indeed, there may not even 
have to be a law passed – simple disclosure by the government may have expressive impacts.116
Expressive theory is present in a number of legal areas.  Equal protection jurisprudence is 
rife with concerns of government stigmatization or marginalization of people based on 
characteristic such as race, ethnicity, and gender.117  The courts have found laws unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause even absent any actual, non-psychic harm: the expression of 
107 Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1513.
108 Id. at 1525.  
109 Id. at 1527-28.
110 Id. at 1531.
111 See Geisinger, supra note 102, at 43; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of 
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2029-44 (1996).
112 Geisinger, supra note 102, at 45.
113 Id. at 47.    
114 Id.
115 Id. at 64-65.
116 Id. at 67.  Geisinger uses the example of the Surgeon General announcing the harm from 
second-hand smoke.  Id.  While not a statute, it is a communication of information from an arm 
of the state.  Thus, the government can send signals even absent an passage of an actual statute.
117 Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1533.
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these views alone is sufficient.118  Similar outcomes are found in the Establishment Clause cases, 
where the court has found state acts as unconstitutionally endorsing religion; such endorsement 
is viewed as impermissible due to the fear of excluding members of society who do not adhere to 
the particular religious views expressed or embraced.119 Criminal punishment, particularly 
incarceration, have received support from expressive theories, which suggest that fines or 
community service in lieu of prison terms does not sufficiently communicate the moral 
condemnation to society that a loss of liberty through imprisonment can.120
Gays and lesbians have long endured laws which inflict expressive harms against 
them.121  Sodomy laws were used to classify homosexuals as “criminals,” even if the laws were 
never enforced.122 Until overturned by the Supreme Court, Colorado’s amendment to the state 
constitution that prohibited cities and municipalities from providing civil rights protection for 
118 Id. at 1534; see Johnson, 2005 WL 415281, at *13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Such 
musings inspire little confidence. Indeed, this comment supports the suspicion that the policy is 
based on racial stereotypes and outmoded fears about the dangers of racial integration. This 
Court should give no credence to such cynical, reflexive conclusions about race.”).
119 Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1547.  Whether those “nonadherents” 
actually feel excluded is irrelevant.  Id  What is key is the governments communication of 
endorsement which necessarily excludes those nonadherents.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 
688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they 
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends 
the opposite message.”).  Justice O’Connor’s views have begun to take hold in the Court’s 
establishment jurisprudence.  See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union 
Greater Pittsburgh, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) (citing O’Connor’s concurrence favorably).  
120 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 605-30 
(1996).  But see Adler, supra note 98, at 1366-68 (discussing and criticizing this theory).  
121 See generally Andrew Koppelman, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY
(1996).  
122 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (“The State cannot demean their 
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”); see also 
Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 
35 HARVARD C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 104 (2000).  Leslie correctly points out that sodomy laws 
harmed gays and lesbians beyond expressive harms, such as providing a basis to deny child 
custody to gay and lesbian parents and denial of certain employment opportunities.  Id.
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gays and lesbians communicated a strong message of inferiority.123 The denial of the right to 
marry also inflicts expressive harms – by being denied rights equal with those of heterosexuals, 
homosexuals are relegated to second-class citizenship.124
Recent patent scholarship has shown that patents communicate information beyond 
technical information regarding the invention.125 This subsection similarly explores the ability of 
patents to communicate messages and signals, but of a non-pecuniary nature.  The grant of a 
patent could communicate government disdain towards various biologically-defined groups and 
behaviors by stating that “curing” these people is normatively good.  Indeed, the patent system 
can be seen as facilitating privatized eugenics, a status of moral ambiguity.  Now is the time to 
consider the possible implications of these inevitable discoveries.126
123 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“We must conclude that Amendment 2 
classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to 
everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to 
its laws.”).  
124 See Opinions of The Justices To The Senate, 440 Mass. 1201, 1207 (2004) (“The 
dissimilitude between the terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil union’ is not innocuous; it is a 
considered choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely 
homosexual, couples to second-class status.”); Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 
Mass. 309, 312 (2003) (“The question before us is whether . . . the Commonwealth may deny the 
protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same 
sex who wish to marry.  We conclude that it may not.  The Massachusetts Constitution affirms 
the dignity and equality of all individuals.  It forbids the creation of second-class citizens.”); see 
also Bonnie Miller Rubin, Same-sex couples see some light, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 18, 2003, 
at 30 ((“Every day, you face reminders that you’re a second-class citizen.”).  Cf. Anderson & 
Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1533-45 (discussing expressivism in the context of equal 
protection jurisprudence, noting that the creation of “second-class citizenship” is one of the 
“most conventional expressive concerns.”).  
125 Long, supra note 7; Wagner &  Parchomovsky, supra note 7; Heald, supra note 7, at 476.  
126 FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 16 (“Technological prediction is notoriously difficult and 
risky, particularly when talking about events that may still lie a generation or two away.  
Nonetheless, it is important to lay out some scenarios for possible futures that suggest a range of 
outcomes, some of which are very likely and even emerging today, and others which may never 
in the end materialize.”).  
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B. Factors that Influence the Expressive Aspect of Patenting
No one has explored what expressive impact, if any, a patent could have.  Currently, the 
patent system is viewed as morally agnostic, making no judgments about the value of individual 
patents.  This perspective may need reconsideration in light of the biotechnology revolution.  As 
researchers discover genes that relate to behaviors, and not diseases, our traditional 
understanding of the patent system will be tested.  The relevant biological processes will 
continue to be a focus of scientific investigation,127 and discoveries in this area certainly will be 
the subject of future patent applications.  For groups such as gays, the deaf, 128 dwarfs,129  and 
high-functioning autistics, the granting of a patent risks communicating that they are inferior, 
flawed members of society that should be cured130 or, potentially through prenatal testing or gene 
127 HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 14, at 301 (“The combination of these two 
forces – the stampede to map the genome plus the decisive role of genes in behavior – means 
that, whether anyone thinks it’s a good idea or not, we soon will have the ability to change and 
manipulate human behavior through genetics.”).
128 Comparisons between the experience of gays and the deaf have been made previously.  
See ROSARIO, supra note 48, at 11 (“Analogous to the case of deaf children struggling to 
consolidate an identity in a hearing family, most gays and lesbians lack familial role models for 
developing a ‘homosexual identity’ if they grow up in a heterosexual household.”).   Richard 
Pillard poignantly explains the comparison:
I suppose most parents would not choose to have a gay child if they could choose 
otherwise.  Fortunately, that choice is not at hand, but similar choices are.  
Deafness will soon be an example.  Deafness is frequently genetic; approximately 
thirty different genetic loci for deafness have been hypothesized. Many people see 
deafness simply as a ‘handicap’ and could not imagine the slightest object to 
reducing or eliminating it.  But those born deaf have a linguistic and cultural 
community, as precious to them as the gay community is to gays.  The deaf, not 
surprisingly, want control of their culture and resent the imperialistic assumptions 
of the hearing majority.
PILLARD, supra note 22, at 238.
129 See id. at 209 (“Something similar [to homosexuality] can be said of dwarfism: human 
heights are distributed normally, and it is not clear at what point in the distribution one becomes 
a dwarf.”).
130 FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 39 (“Scientific knowledge about causation will inevitably 
lead to a technological search for ways to manipulate that causality.”).
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therapy, eliminated altogether.131 I will use homosexuality as the paradigm to explore this 
expressive potential. The use of patents in the context of sexual orientation research is nearly a 
foregone conclusion. Dean Hamer has already stated that, if he isolates a gay gene, he intends to 
obtain intellectual property rights on it.132
What is consider “normal” versus “pathological,” while arguably objective scientifically, 
is necessarily infected with moral and cultural values.133 This bias can readily be seen in the 
context of sexual orientation:  the search is for a “gay gene,” not “the sexual orientation gene,” 
even though necessarily such a gene would be relevant in the development of a heterosexual 
orientation as well as a homosexual one.134 No matter how objective any individual method or 
131 LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 23 (“[W]ill we develop the technology to 
engineer homosexuality out of the human race, for example, and if so, should we be taking steps 
to prevent this from happening.”).
132 Hamer states that he plans to use the rights to exclude others from using the discovery in 
a way harmful to others.  HAMER, supra note 78, at 219 (“Third, I would try to use the law to 
withhold the ‘testing’ technology should it ever become available.  Genetic testing as practiced 
in the United States requires commercialization, and commercialization generally requires 
protection of intellectual property through patents.  If a lab does discover a ‘gay gene,’ it might 
be able to control the licensing of the technology.”); see also ALLEN, supra note 34, at 227 
(“[Hamer] also vowed to patent his genetic testing techniques to insure that they could not be 
used in a discriminatory way.”).  Of course a patent right is only temporary – at the end of the 
term, anyone is free to use the invention.  So, Hamer’s laudable objective could only be 
temporarily realized.  
133 See ROSARIO, supra note 48, at 4  (“[T]he ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’—in their very 
quantitative arbitrariness—disguise the cultural and moral values they perpetuate.”); ANNE 
FAUSTO-STERLING, How to Build a Man, in SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 219, 224  (ed. 
Vernon A. Rosario) (1997) (“Because they represent scientific findings, one might imagine that 
they contain no preconceptions, no culturally instigated belief systems.  But this turns out not to 
be the case.  Although based on evidence, scientific writing can be seen as a particular kind of 
cultural interpretation—the enculturated scientist interprets nature.”); Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra 
note 14, at 333 (noting “persons at risk” due to genetic condition as “people whose physical 
condition removed them from the class of normalcy”).    
134 LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 221 (“I have never heard of a single instance 
of a heterosexual, whatever problems he may have been facing, inquiring about the nature and 
origins of heterosexuality, or asking why he was a heterosexual, or considering these matters 
important.” (quoting F.E. Kameny, Does research into homosexuality matter?, THE LADDER 14-
20 (1965));  LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 5 (“What should be emphasized, though, 
29
research may be, political and moral considerations will infect the results135 and, consequently, 
impact the view a patent on such subject matter would have within the general population.  Such 
research is inextricably linked not only with what causes homosexuality but also with what it 
means to be a homosexual.136  The medicalization of homosexuality in the past has been used to 
stigmatize and marginalize homosexuals.137  The threat to these groups of eugenic application of 
these technologies to eliminate them is real.138  Eugenics conflates science with the moral.139
is that seeking the cause of homosexuality is really the same thing as seeking the cause of 
heterosexuality. . . . If ‘gay genes’ make a person gay, then ‘straight genes’ make a person 
straight. . . . When we study homosexuality we are inevitably studying heterosexuality also, even 
if we do not always express it that way.” ); ALLEN, supra note 34, at 251 (“For another, if 
homosexuality was not viewed as a pathology, then we cannot sensibly ask about its cause or 
origins separate from the causes or origins of heterosexuality and sexual practices in general.”).
135 ROSARIO, supra note 48, at 12 (“Despite Hamer[sic, ‘s] and LeVay’s protests that 
scientific research on homosexuality should and can be ‘objective’ and apolitical, it should be 
clear that even if it adheres to the methods and standards of scientific correctness, such research 
is inevitably interlaced with deeper narratives and hidden motivations that reflect the political 
climate of the moment as well as the personal aspirations of individual researchers.”).
136 Id. at 14.
137 MARGARET GIBSON, Clitoral Corruption: Body Metaphors and American Doctors’ 
Constructions of Female Homosexuality 1870-1900, in SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 108, 
108 (ed. Vernon A. Rosario) (1997) (“Through these connections, doctors were able to further 
marginalize and exoticize the female invert or homosexual, and minimize the threat that the 
existence of such individuals might pose to broader beliefs about sexuality, gender, and intimate 
relationships.”); CARLSTON, supra note 1, at 175 (nothing that historians “have suggested how 
damaging the internalization of [the concept of homosexuality as pathology and abnormal] could 
be to people with homoerotic feelings or in homosexual relations.”).
138 Id. at 85  (“Hanging over the entire field of genetics has been the specter of eugenics –
that is, the deliberate breeding of people for certain selected heritable traits.”); ROSARIO, supra 
note 48, at 6 ([T]he classification of homosexuality as abnormal or pathological does not exist in 
an essential way within its examination by scientists, but is constructed from a complex 
interaction of social values and individual researchers’ and subjects’ approaches, methods, and 
presuppositions.”); LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 67, at 171 (“On the one hand, this search 
[for a gay gene], if successful, seems to promise the most direct support for a liberating ‘born 
that way’ argument.  On the other hand, it raises what is invariably described as the ‘specter of 
Nazi eugenics’ – the possibility that attempts will be made to eliminate homosexuality through 
genetic ‘therapy,’ through the selective destruction of fetuses that carry ‘gay genes,’ or through 
sterilization of gay adults.”).
139 GIBSON, supra note 137, at 111-12 (“Social Darwinism and the start of the eugenics 
movement provided a framework in which to discuss moral issues in an increasingly biological 
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Consequently, these technologies easily can be viewed not only as a threat to the human dignity 
of gays and lesbians but also a threat to their existence140 Biological conversion technologies 
will undoubtedly be protected by patents, and this eugenic potential informs the potential 
expressive impact of granting patent rights in this area.
Investigation of factors relative to an expressive harms have never been discussed.  For 
legislation, the communication of the message was presumed: it was simply not relevant whether 
the general populace was aware of a law being on the books.  Statutes are public in nature and 
thus tend to “‘stand out’ against the background of public discourse.”141  The nature of law as a 
governmental act necessarily communicates something to the public.  The content of every law, 
of course, is not expressed to the public, but laws can permeate the public sphere in a variety of 
ways – advertisement by the state, particular controversies surrounding a new law that are 
reported in the media,142 and the potential for sanctions against third parties.143  Laws or 
governmental communications, particularly those that impact people directly, are more likely to 
have an expressive impact.  Such an assumption may not be valid in the patent context, however.  
This section will identify a variety of factors that influence the expressive potential of 
patents.  The first two of these factors are relevant to the threshold issue of whether patents can 
send expressive signals at all.  The remaining factors concern the strength of such a signal and 
way, using the human body not just as a personal unit, but as a representation of the limits to 
human progress and of regression into an animal past.”).  
140 FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 39-40.  Indeed, the LeVay findings regarding the brain in 
fact already spurred anti-gay and lesbian groups to attempt conversion methods.  LeVay, QUEER 
SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 134.
141 Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 
1666, 1668 (2000).
142 Patents in the biotech world have garnered media attention already.  See infra note 162
and accompanying text.
143 Id. at 1668-69.
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address the issue of whether any such signal may be lost in other “noise.”  This expressive 
message is a part of the communicative ability of patents.  
1. The Grant of a Patent as a Governmental Act – Are Patents Akin to Statutes?
Generally, expressive theory has focused on statutes passed by governments, such as 
sodomy laws or laws that discriminate on the basis of race, gender, or other categories.144
Commentators have also noted that expressive communications could occur through regulatory 
agencies and even judges.145  Others have suggested that mere government communications that 
fall short of a statute can serve a signaling function.146  What is key is a government 
communication – via statute or other information –that transmits the expressive message to the 
public.  The question thus arises: is the grant of a patent akin to a statute or other form of 
government communication?
Patents serve purposes beyond simply affording the inventors exclusive rights to their 
inventions.  They also serve to notify the public as to the scope of those rights, as well as 
providing a disclosure to the public so that the know-how underlying the invention will enter the 
public domain.  Recent scholarship has demonstrated that patents can communicate information 
beyond merely the extent of the inventor’s exclusive rights.  Patents can serve as economic 
signals to other entities about the innovative abilities and strength of a company.147   They can 
also be used as a mechanism to reduce transaction costs between parties.148  These roles for 
patents demonstrate that patents have a broader role in the public than the basic disclosure 
obligations suggest.  The main reason patents can serve such varied functions is because they are 
144 See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1533-64.
145 McAdams, supra note 141, at 1678-89.
146 See supra note 116.
147 See generally Long, supra note 7; Wagner and Gideon Parchomovsky, supra note 7.
148 See generally, Heald, supra note 7.  
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grants of exclusive rights from the federal government.  While technically legislation, the patent 
grant can be viewed as akin to private legislation.149
Courts have compared patents to statutes previously, recognizing that they share common 
features: “There can be only one correct interpretation of a statute that applies to all persons.  
Statutes are written instruments that all persons are presumed to be aware of and are bound to 
follow. Statutes, like patents, are enforceable against the public, unlike private agreements 
between contracting parties.” 150  Thus, while a patent granted by an agency and not a enacted by 
Congress, patents and statutes do share several similarities, particularly the function of 
establishing rights of which the public is presumptively aware.  These rights derive directly from 
the federal government through the substantive review and grant afforded by the PTO.
Members of the public look to patents as a signal something beyond mere technical 
information, such as signal of the firm’s innovativeness.  There is no reason they cannot 
communicate other, non-commercial messages.  Previous experience demonstrates that, like 
statutes, patents can communicate signals of morality.  Controversies over biotechnology patents 
confirm that the public does make the link between a patent and potential moral signaling from 
the federal government.151  The public looks at what is being granted because the government is 
giving its imprimatur on the disclosed invention.152  The patent system is in essence an incentive 
system by the government to encourage innovation, innovation which in some circumstances 
149 John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 HOUSTON L. REV. 569, 582 
(2002) (“Patents may be conceived as a sort of private legislation.”).  
150 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
aff’d 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
151 See Bagley, supra 12, at 473 (“The patent [on cloning products], and news reports of 
other human cloning activity, drew critical reaction, commentary, and calls for legislative action 
from a variety of sources.”).
152 Id. at 475-76 (acknowledging that, while banning patents on morally controversial 
subject matter will not halt research in those areas, “the availability of a government imprimatur 
granting exclusive rights over morally inventions is a separate but important issue as well”).  
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may be of morally questionable subject matter.153  The grant of the patent informs the public that 
the government has deemed the disclosed invention as worthy of the governmentally granted 
right to exclude.  
Patents undisputedly can serve as the government’s “stamp of approval.”  Patents can 
“legitimate novel technologies and the theories that they apply.”154 They can “validate 
inventions” of questionable scientific credibility.155  The same impact could be had on morally 
questionable inventions—the patent validates these inventions as legitimate, ethical science.
Because the patent is awarded by the government after careful review, it communicates that this 
morally questionable subject matter has legitimacy.  
The salience of this position is clearer if patents are considered as a form of government 
subsidy.156 Few would deny that the federal government has the ability (and perhaps the 
obligation) to deny direct funding to morally objectionable research.  We do not want our tax 
money going into research that is offensive.  A patent is effectively indirect federal funding: the 
government’s grant of the patent requires the public to pay for the invention due to the exclusive 
rights afforded under the patent.  Therefore, denying patent protection (while paradoxically 
allowing the use of the invention to be even more widespread157) does seem reasonable.  The 
153 Id. at 476.
154 Peter Lee, supra note 12, at 676.  
155 Id.
156 See Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1032 (2005) (arguing that patents should be viewed as government subsidy).  Whether 
intellectual property should be considered as “property” as opposed to a form of government 
subsidy is the subject of considerable debate.  See generally id. at 1033-46 (discussing the rise of 
view of intellectual property as a form of property).  
157 If patent protection is denied, then no one has the right to exclude others from practicing 
the invention.  Unless held as a trade secret, the technology becomes free for others to practice.  
Even if the invention is held as a trade secret, independent discovery would permit third parties 
to use the technology free of liability.  Denial of patent protection, however, lessens the incentive 
to engage in such research, so there might be some slowing of development in a morally 
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same would be the case if the government simply was distributing research grants: denial of 
funds would not stop research into the technological area, but likely would slow such research 
while also expressing government concerns with the technology.  The recent denials of federal 
funding on stem cell research exemplifies the reality that government subsidies are laced with 
moral considerations.158
The mere grant of a patent – independent of the whether the technology develops –
implicates moral concerns.  Passed in an appropriations bill in 2004, the Weldon Amendment 
precludes the PTO from using any of its funds to issue a patent with “claims directed to or 
encompassing a human organism.”159 Congressman Dave Weldon was concerned with the 
commodification of humanity, where “technology can be used to undermine what is meant to be 
human, including the exploitation of human nature for the purpose of financial gain.”160
Weldon noted that “[j]ust because something can be done does not mean that it should be 
done. . .We should not allow such researchers to gain financially by granting them an exclusive 
right to practice such ghoulish research.”161 Significantly, and paradoxically to some, denying 
patents, or precluding their issuance due to funding limitations, will not stop the creation of such 
technology.  Patent denial means that anyone who develops the technology will be free to use it, 
absent regulatory or legal restraints on such technologies that arise outside of the patent laws.  
The band does remove the government-provided incentive to develop such technologies.  Thus, 
questionable area, just as denial of federal funds would slow, although not stop, research into 
certain areas.  The recent stem cell controversies are exemplary of this dynamic.  
158 See  Christopher Robertson, Recent Developments in the Law and Ethics of Embryonic 
Research: Can Science Resolve the Ethical Problems it Creates?, 33 J. L., MED., & ETHICS 384, 
384 (2005).  I personally disagree with this decision.  
159 H.R. 2673, Pub. L. No. 108-199; see PTO Issues Patent on Methods for Cloning 
Mammals, May Run Afoul of Law, 68 BNA’S PATENT, TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT JOURNAL
485, 486 (Aug. 27, 2004).
160 Cong. Rec. (July 22, 2003) (comments of Rep. Weldon on H7274).
161 Id.
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fears and objections to patenting humans, therefore, must be rooted in something broader – the 
idea that patents can express government endorsement of morally objectionable technologies.162
Similar concerns with the ability of patents to communicate a message of moral 
endorsement of technologies by governments is apparent in international patent treaties.  The 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) allows signatories to 
exclude from patentability inventions on the basis of morality and the ordre public.163 Because 
the denial of a patent would not prevent these morally objectionable technologies from 
developing, these provisions serve only to eliminate the signaling problem.  Other incentives 
operate to encourage scientists to develop such technologies, as can be seen in the context of 
cloning humans.  Thus, the only purpose for such exclusions is to allow governments to avoid 
granting the patent on these controversial inventions and to avoid the government’s imprimatur.
The public has already become aware of controversial patents, confirming the ability of 
individual patents to communicate information to the public-at-large.  There has been 
considerable media coverage of, and outcry against, the patenting of animals, genes, and humans 
generally.164  As such, patents could serve to communicate a message to the public, both gay and 
162 Activists previously had pushed the PTO on the morality of patents related to humans by 
filing an application for an animal-human chimera.    The PTO rejected the application on 
subject matter grounds because the invention embraced a human.  See PTO Issues Patent on 
Methods for Cloning Mammals, May Run Afoul of Law, 68 BNA’S PATENT, TRADEMARK, & 
COPYRIGHT JOURNAL 485, 486 (Aug. 27, 2004).  The PTO recently issued a final rejection of this 
application on the basis that the invention was too closely related to a human, notwithstanding 
that no legal basis exists for that distinction.  See Office Action of Patent Application No. 
10/308,135 (Aug. 11, 2004) (final rejection) (on file with author); see also Rick Weiss, U.S. 
Denies Patent on Too-Human Hybrid, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2005, at A03.
163 TRIPS, art. 27(2).
164 See Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life, 28 
JURIMETRICS J. 399, 399-400 (1988) (“Although patent law experts and biotechnology 
companies greeted the decision as a welcome and logical extension of existing patent law, the 
action triggered a much less favorable response from the media, a variety of political and 
religious groups, and some members of Congress.”).  
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straight, that gays and lesbians are inferior or defective in some sense.  In light of the public 
nature of patent rights and the already demonstrated ability of patents to transmit information 
beyond simply explaining the scope of exclusive rights, patents can have affects similar to that as 
legislation, including expressive impacts.  
2. The Utility Standard—Does a Patent Inform Us what is Normatively “Good”?
While patents and the inventions disclosed therein can intersect with morally 
questionable subject matter, the key aspect of an expressive harm is from the government’s 
assessment that an invention is “good” and worthy of a patent.  This element is the utility 
standard of patent law.  An invention must have utility in order to be eligible for patent 
protection. 165  Generally, the utility requirement is easy to satisfy: an invention will be useful “if 
it actually works to achieve at least one of its stated purposes.”166 The inventor must 
demonstrate that the invention has only one use that benefits society, even if there are numerous 
other uses that would be detrimental.  The courts and PTO generally use the utility requirement 
to reject inventions that belie scientific laws, such as a perpetual motion machine.167  Only in the 
chemical context is utility really an issue – the mere knowledge of a chemical structure is 
insufficient for a patent unless a use for the chemical is known.  For mechanical devices, utility 
is rather simple to demonstrate – the mousetrap either snaps closed or it does not.  The PTO 
recently issued guidelines for establishing utility to deal with complications arising from the 
patenting of human genes and gene fragments.  The standard set in the guidelines is that an 
165 35 U.S.C. § 101.
166 Gitter, supra note 35, at 1662-63.
167 Interestingly, the PTO used to include cures for baldness in this category.  
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invention must have a substantial, specific, and credible utility to be eligible for patent 
protection.168
Historically, the utility requirement also contained a morality component: inventions 
viewed as immoral lacked utility per se and were ineligible for patent protection.169  For 
example, the PTO at one time viewed patents on gambling machines as ineligible for patent 
protection because their only use was immoral.170 Moral utility appears to be withering away.171
In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,172 the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of the 
district court, which had concluded the invention lacked utility because its sole purpose was to 
deceive consumers.173  The Federal Circuit distinguished Justice Storie’s morality-based view of 
utility.  Noting that this principle “has not been applied broadly in recent years,”174 the court 
concluded that there was “no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled 
unpatentable for lack of utility simply because they have the capacity to fool some members of 
the public.”175
Consistent with this amoral approach to the utility, the PTO has rejected all morality-
based arguments against patenting human genes.  Specifically, the PTO rejected the argument 
that “patents should not issue for genes because the sequence of the human genome is at the core 
168 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1093, 1094 (Patent and Trademark 
Office, Jan. 5, 2001).
169 See, e.g., Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (D. Mass. 1817) (“All that the law requires is, 
that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound 
morals of society.  The word ‘useful,’ therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction 
to mischievous or immoral.”).
170 See, e.g., Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512 (7th Cir.1922). The PTO now does allow 
patents on gambling devices.  See In re Murphy, 200 USPQ 801 (PTO Bd. App. 1977).
171 But see infra notes 185-191 and accompanying text (exploring PTO’s reliance on 
morality post-Juicy Whip).
172 185 F3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
173 Id. at 1366.       
174 Juicy Whip, 185 F3d at 1366-67.
175 Id. at 1368.
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of what it means to be human and no person should be able to own/control something so 
basic.”176  The PTO reasoned that genes, as a discovery,177 are patentable so long as they satisfy 
the statutory requirements for obtaining a patent – novelty, non-obviousness, utility, and the 
disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.178  Because patents “do not confer ownership of 
genes, genetic information, or sequences,” but instead only the right to exclude others from 
utilizing the invention,179 the risk of an entity “owning” someone else’s genes is unfounded.180
The PTO’s approach is neutral and scientifically objective: the PTO will apply the statutory 
standards without regard to the moral implications of the underlying invention.  
Utility is an inherently relative concept, however.  One person’s invention on a drug 
delivery system could be another person’s suicide machine.  The patent laws do not define the 
proper population segment by which utility must be addressed.  The “at least one use” standard 
would seem to include small, discrete populations.  The utility guidelines do not elucidate as to 
whom that one benefit must inure.  Is it society as whole?  If a patented invention could be used 
harshly against one segment – perhaps a minority – should that be viewed as useful, even if the 
benefit afforded to the majority is slight?  Is there an implicit cost/benefit analysis that should be 
performed, in that the benefit to society as a whole must be greater than the cost to society, or is 
merely one benefit, regardless of other potential costs, sufficient?  Present PTO law seems to 
176 See id.
177 For an argument that genes, even as isolated and purified products of nature, should not 
constitute a “discovery” under the Constitution and Patent Act, see generally Linda J. Demaine 
and Aaron Xavier Fellmeth,  Reinventing The Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious 
Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303 (2002).  See also
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the United 
States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 10-11 (2004).
178 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1093, 1094 (Patent and Trademark 
Office, Jan. 5, 2001).
179 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).  
180 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1093, 1094 (Patent and Trademark 
Office, Jan. 5, 2001).
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suggest the latter – there need be only one use, regardless of the harms from the invention and 
indeed regardless of whether the harms outweigh the benefits.  No policy balancing takes place.  
As an administrative matter, the lack of balancing may make sense.  The PTO is not in a 
position to assess the all of the potential consequences of a given invention, whereas, through the 
disclosures of the patentee, they are in a relatively good position to assess the benefits.  Thus, 
administratively, the lack of a balancing approach may be efficient.181 As patents continue to 
issue on genes and other aspects of humankind that implicate who we are, as opposed to what we 
do, then perhaps reconsideration of the lack of balancing is appropriate, particularly as 
discoveries are made that relate to non-pathological conditions.
To demonstrate this concern, this article will consider as a thought experiment the 
implications of patenting a method of altering sexual orientation.  Suppose that a scientist invents 
a method of changing the sexual orientation of a patient from gay to straight.  Such a conversion 
suggests that homosexuality is pathological and should be remedied.182  The question is whether 
a method to convert a homosexual to a heterosexual satisfies the utility requirement of patent law 
and accordingly be patentable.  To some in the heterosexual community, a method to convert 
gays to straights might be viewed as useful.  It would maintain the status of heterosexuality as 
the norm and, for those who are opposed to gay rights, it would provide a basis for objecting to 
legal protections for gays and lesbians.  In the extreme, there would be a risk of forced 
participation in conversion programs by parents, particularly of under age gays and lesbians, or 
181 Cf.  Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 N W. U.. L. REV. 1495 
(2001) (arguing that, given the few patents actually litigated or licensed, devoting more resources 
to the review of patents at the Patent Office would be wasteful).  
182 See Larry Thompson, Search for a Gay Gene, TIME 60-61 (June 12, 1995) (“The Rev. 
Louis P. Sheldon, president of the Traditional Values Coalition in Anaheim, California, says that 
if a biological cause of homosexuality is found, then ‘we would have to come up with some 
reparative therapy to correct that genetic defect.’”).
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for the use of the technology in utero.  Gays and lesbians would be further marginalized because 
there status would now no longer be immutable.
Now suppose that a method to alter sexual orientation is discovered, but the effected 
conversion is only from straight to gay.  Would the patent system view this invention has 
satisfying the utility requirement?.  The answer may hinge on the relative nature of the utility 
requirement.  From the perspective of the majority, homosexuality is not the norm and thus such 
a conversion would not be useful.  This approach would feed the fears of the majority of a 
systemic “conversion” campaign by gays and lesbians to recruit straight people into their ranks.  
Conservative organizations would never stand for a grant of exclusive rights for changing a 
person into a gay or lesbian, and in the current political environment, the issuance of such a 
patent seems highly unlikely.   From the perspective of gays and lesbians, however, such an 
invention could be useful.  A gay or lesbian couple who is having a child, for example, may 
prefer to have a gay or lesbian child as well.  To the extent that parents want to see themselves in 
their children, some gay or lesbian parents may prefer to have a homosexual child.183
The utility standard in this case is more perplexing, even though the genetics or 
biological pathways involved with this hypothetical likely are the same as the first scenario.  The 
biological processes creating predispositions towards homosexuality also likely implicate 
predispositions to heterosexuality.  The benefit here would accrue only to a small segment of 
society, although the benefit to that small segment could be immense.  The majority would 
seemingly be unharmed, although strong political and moral resistance to such technology, and 
the patent itself, would be likely.  
183 It could also result, of course, in the abortion of a heterosexual fetus.  LEVAY, QUEER 
SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 267 (“In fact, there might also be some lesbians who, desirous of 
having a lesbian or gay child, would abort a fetus that was predisposed to become 
heterosexual.”).  
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Nevertheless, the patentability of a method to convert heterosexuals seems in serious 
doubt.  This point is even more salient if one considers the other groups implicated by the 
potential expressive harms from patents, the deaf, dwarfs, and high-functioning autistics.  For 
example, deaf parents very well may prefer to have a deaf child, so such an invention allowing 
them to have a genetically deaf child could be useful to them.  It seems highly unlikely, however, 
that the PTO would view an invention that ensures a deaf child would be viewed as useful, 
notwithstanding the value to the parents.
The patentability of these two conversion hypotheticals is not the only relevant 
consideration in assessing the potential impact the patent system could have.  The relative 
patentability of these two scenarios also merits contemplation.  If the patent office were to grant 
a patent on one but not the other,  what would be the implications for the patent system and 
society?  A modification of this thought-experiment elucidates the potential consequences of this 
concern.  Given the two possible scenarios – a method to change gays to straights or straights to 
gays (or, to make people hear and make them deaf, to make them dwarfs or of statistically 
normal height, etc)., four permutations for Patent Office action follow: (1) grant patents for both 
transformations; (2) deny patents for both; (3) allow patent protection for the transformation  
from straight-to-gay (or hearing-to-deaf, etc.); and (4) allow patent protection only for reverse 
transformation (gay-to-straight; deaf-to-hearing, etc.).
Grant Both
Grant patent on Gay-to-Straight
Grant patent on Straight-to-Gay
Differential Grant #1
Grant patent on Gay-to-Straight
Deny patent on Straight-to-Gay
Differential Grant #2 Deny both
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Deny patent on Gay-to-Straight
Grant patent on Straight-to-Gay
Deny patent on Gay-to-Straight
Deny patent on Straight-to-Gay
a) Grant Patents on Both Gay-to-Straight and Straight-to-Gay
The first permutation is if the PTO were to allow claims covering methods for conversion 
in either direction.  If the PTO were to grant a patent on both, then the expressive impact would 
be more limited.  Under this scenario, the Patent Office would interpret the utility requirement to 
reflect the value that either scenario would have to the respective groups.  This would be a true 
application of the “single benefit to one” approach that is ostensibly the current rule.  The grant 
of the patent here arguably is morally neutral and would not be construed as suggesting that the 
government views heterosexuality as superior to homosexuality.  
This seemingly neutral approach could communicate a negative expressive message
nevertheless.  While it is true that under this scenario the patent would seem to express 
indifference towards either straights or gays, the societal context must be considered.    The 
neutrality of the invention, and its corresponding patent, may not negate the marginalization of 
the technology:
a heterosexual child might be preferable for reasons that might appear most 
salient to homosexuals themselves in lieu of the discrimination they have 
encountered.  The use of a technology by people against whom it may 
discriminate (even if they attempt to use it to their benefit) does not establish its 
neutrality.184
Thus, even a facially neutral technology can be discriminatory; similarly, the grant of an 
apparently neutral patent can still express a message of discrimination and marginalization to the 
relevant groups.  The concern for these marginalized communities could very well be that the 
184 Id.
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technology, notwithstanding its seeming neutral face, will be used disproportionately against 
them.  Given the construct surrounding the gay gene – there is never talk of a “straight” gene or a 
more generic “sexual orientation gene” – the most likely scenario would be that the only 
application would be towards the gay gene.  The “utility” standard would be satisfied, 
reinforcing the idea that homosexuality is outside the norm and akin to a pathological condition.  
So, the seemingly neutral “grant to both” may yet inflict an expressive harm.  
b) Grant Patents on Neither
Another option to consider would be that the PTO rejects all variations of the invention, 
deeming them as lacking utility.  The PTO could alternatively decline to issue patents on these 
processes, resulting in a minimal expressive impact.  Of course, the PTO must have a basis to 
reject these applications.  Seemingly the only basis for rejecting both would be on a morality 
ground, which is disfavored under present law.
A recent rejection at the PTO office, however, suggests that use of morality may yet 
resurface at the PTO, offering the potential for rejection of both inventions.  An examiner at the
PTO recently rejected an application directed to animal-human chimeras, and one of the bases 
for this rejection was utility.185   In her utility analysis, the examiner did not limit her 
consideration to scientific or industrial usefulness.  Instead, she distinguished the Federal 
Circuit’s seeming evisceration of moral utility in Juicy Whip and drew upon Justice Story’s 
formulation.186  The examiner acknowledged that “[t]he question of whether humans should be 
subject of exclusive patent rights raises grave issues going to the core of what a ‘useful’ 
185 Office Action on Patent Application No. 10/308,135 (Dec. 3, 2002) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Non-final Rejection]; see also Office Action on Patent Application No. 10/308,135 
(Aug. 11, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Final Rejection] (final rejection relying on 
same basis as non-final rejection).
186 Non-final Rejection at 21-22.  The examiner reasoned that Juicy Whip dealt with the need 
for the patent system “not to displace the police powers of the state or other federal agencies.”  
Id. at 22.
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invention is.”187  In embracing the utility standard in the patent statute, Congress was 
presumptively aware of the moral utility doctrine and “did not disavow” it.  The examiner 
recognized that utility in this context is one of public policy, one that “takes into account the 
common sense of the community.”188
As such, the examiner concluded that Congress, not the PTO, should be the first to 
address this public policy issue and that, for the PTO to grant such a patent, would “usurp the 
power of Congress to speak first to these issues.”189  She expressly recognized that “utility,” as 
simply a technical standard, is one infected with public policy:
The discretion to consider the well-being and good policy of society implicit in 
the statutory term “useful” is properly applied when a refusal to grant a patent is 
necessary to avoid preempting the power of Congress to define essential questions 
of public policy. . . .[T]he USPTO would be acting improperly in the pace of 
Congress to “fill a gap” in the law if it were to grant a patent covering human 
beings; it acts pursuant to soundly based deference to the constitutionally 
empowered institutions of government in denying such a patent application.190
Thus, in this context, the examiner recognized that “utility” is infused with public policies 
concerns and that consideration of the “community” (whoever that community may be) is 
important.  Technically, however, these observations are only those of one particular examiner 
and do not establish PTO policy.  Given the intense public scrutiny given this particular 
application, however, it seems highly likely that policymakers at the PTO were involved in 
drafting the office action.  The PTO therefore has plausible deniability – while effectively an 
expression of policy by the PTO, it is legally only the views of one examiner which cannot be 
used to bind the entire PTO, if the PTO decides to change its stance.  Additionally, the idea of 
denying the patent in order to allow Congress to consider the issue first is inconsistent with the 
187 Id. at 22.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 22-23.  
190 Id. at 23. 
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Supreme Court’s reasoning in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, where the court allowed the patenting of 
a life form and noted that it is for the courts to decide patent eligibility in the first instance.191
At a minimum, however, this language shows that the PTO is indeed aware of the 
relativity of utility.  Its reference to “community” seems to mean the entire U.S. society, but 
necessarily communities can be of varying sizes.  What is useful to one community seemingly 
may not be useful, and indeed may be harmful, to another.  Thus, the PTO could root a decision 
denying patent protection on all forms of such “conversion” technologies.  The flat out denial of 
patent protection would send a rather sharp expressive message that such eugenic-like 
technologies are not properly within the ambit of the patent system.
c) Differential grant #1: Grant Patent Only on Gay-to-Straight
The use of the morality lever could cut in a much more hostile manner towards gays and 
lesbians.  The Patent Office could treat such processes differently and afford patent protection 
for only gay-to-straight conversions or a methods of preventing homosexuality.  Granting 
technologies in this discriminatory manner undeniably would inflict a clear expressive harm to 
homosexuals.  The “usefulness” of the patent is to cure homosexuals, reinforcing the view that 
gays are pathologically flawed.  Given the role of patents as showing the affording the 
imprimatur of the government, these grants would imply that U.S. government views 
technologies that convert gays to straight as normatively good.  The same would be true for the 
other relevant groups—that we view those communities as flawed in a way that needs to be 
corrected. This reality is very stark in the context of the deaf and other biologically-influenced 
groups, where patents on technologies to cure deafness would send a signal to these groups that 
191 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).  The PTO had denied the patent 
application originally, apparently attempting to use the approach espoused by the examiner here 
and ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court.  See Bagley, supra note 12, at 486-88.
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they should be cured.  If the PTO were to explicitly allow patent protection only for these 
methods of curing, then there would be considerable expressive consequences.  
d) Differential grant #2: Grant Patent Only on Straight-to-Gay
The final option in this thought experiment is that the PTO would issue patents only on 
straight-to-gay conversions or the prevention of heterosexuality – in other words, “cures” for 
heterosexuality.  If the PTO granted a patent on such a method, then value to the gay and lesbian 
community under this view would be recognized.  A positive message would be sent that 
recognizes that some members of this community may want to have offspring that share their 
genetic trait.  The odds that the Patent Office would indeed allow such a grant seems slim, if not 
impossible given the political consequences of such an act.  This point again is more poignantly 
made if we consider the deaf or autistics.  It seems unlikely that the PTO would view as “useful” 
processes to guarantee the birth of a deaf or highly-functioning autistic child.  
These four scenarios afford considerable insight on the potential expressive harms from 
granting patents in this area.  Looking at these four possible scenarios, the possibility of 
expressive harm is reduced if the two processes are treated the same – denying protection on 
both or granting protection for both.  These scenarios are of course hypothetical: they assume 
that the PTO would actually be presented with patent applications for both processes
simultaneously.  
The reality is, however, that the current system on its face offers no opportunity for 
balancing such concerns, but the PTO’s own words in the human-animal chimera application 
show that it is aware of this issue and is willing to rely upon community concerns and morality in 
assessing utility.  Its objectivity therefore is over-stated, and the concerns about differential 
grants of patents involving sexual orientation therefore have considerable traction.  
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3. The Nature and Scope of the Claim
The first two factors – whether patents are like statutes and the utility standard – are 
essential in assessing whether any expressive communication could emanate from the grant of a 
patent at all.  The remaining factors relate more to the strength of such a signal and whether the 
expressive message could be lost in other noise.
One key aspect of any communication would be the nature of the disclosed invention 
itself and the scope of the patent’s right to exclude.  A patent claim can be directed to a process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.192  Machines and manufactures generally are 
not implicated for inventions relating to biology.  Whether the invention is a process or method, 
in contrast to a composition of matter, could affect the extent of an expressive message 
significantly.  The above hypothetical helps demonstrate this point.  If the invention is a method 
to alter or modify sexual orientation, the expressive impact would be greater, whereas a claim to 
a gene or protein that influences sexual orientation  would be more ambiguous.  A method claim 
must identify a particular outcome, which would highlight the purpose of the invention.  Method 
claims therefore would inflict expressive harms more directly.  
In contrast, a claim for a composition of matter only covers the structure of that 
compound.  The specification will have to identify a use for the compound, but a biological 
materials often can have multiple functions.193 Originally, scientists believed the human genome 
could contain upwards of 80,000 genes.194  This number, thanks to the Human Genome Project, 
192 35 U.S.C. § 101.
193 See, e.g., Ted J. Ebersole, et. al., Patent pools and standard setting in diagnostic genetics, 
23 NATURE BIOTECH. 937, 937 (2005).
194 RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 5 (“There are probably 30,000-80,000 genes in the human 
genome. . . .”).
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has proven to be a gross overestimation.  The current estimate is around 25,000 genes.195  The 
consequence of this relatively small set of genes is that a single gene performs numerous 
functions.196  Genes that implicate sexual orientation may be relevant in other biological 
processes.  The expressive impact of a patent that discloses both a function related to sexual 
orientation as well as one unrelated to orientation could differ from that of a patent directed 
solely to a gay gene.  Particularly, suppose the claim is merely to a gene with a given sequence, 
and the specification discloses a variety of functions, one of which happens to be influencing 
sexual orientation.  The expressive message would seem to be muted in that context given the 
multiplicity of function.  
The level of muting, however, would not be significant.  While a compound claim may 
not produce as strong of a signal as a method claim, a claim to a biological product influencing 
sexual orientation would still likely provide a strong signal given the cultural and social context 
of homosexuality.  The fact remains that one reason the patent on this gene is considered useful 
is that it influences sexual orientation, again suggesting that such knowledge and the potential to 
modify such genes is a societal good.  The mere pursuit of this scientific inquiry is infected with 
prejudice and homophobia.197  As one commentator has noted, “there hasn’t been one instance in 
history where the results of etiologic sexual orientation research have not been used against gay 
people.  On the contrary, virtually every ‘cause’ of homosexuality has been accompanied by 
195 See Anthony L. Komaroff and George Q. Daley, Harnessing Stem Cells, NEWSWEEK, 
Dec. 6, 2004, at 54.  Previous analyses has suggested 30,000-40,000.  See Gitter, supra note 35, 
at 1633.
196 Cf.  Gitter, supra note 35, at 1671 (noting the potential for “subsequent researchers later 
[to determine[] that the DNA segment was involved in other illnesses”)
197 Udo Schüklenk, Science, ‘Gay Genes’, and the ‘Third Sex’, GAY AND LESBIAN 
HUMANIST (Spring 1997) (available at www.galha.org/glh/163/etiology.html).    
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attempts to ‘heal’ gay people.”198  Investigations into the biological origins is not truly value-
neutral given the context of gays and lesbians in today’s society because “the very motivation for 
seeking the ‘origin’ of homosexuality has its source within social frameworks that are 
pervasively homophobic.”199  Thus, even a patent on the gene itself, although arguably neutral in 
application because it could affect both gay and straight sexual orientation, is pregnant with an 
expression of marginalization given the homophobic context of society.  
Where this issue may be more important may not be the question of whether there is an 
expressive communication, but whether or not to do anything about such communication given 
that the gene has other uses aside from influencing sexual orientation.200  We may simply 
conclude that, given the complexity of genetic science, parsing patent rights on possible 
expressive harms simply is not worth it.
4. Who is the Inventor or the Owner?
Unlike legislation, the PTO can only pass judgment on the applications presented to it by 
inventors.  This begs the question of whether the identity of the inventor could serve to mitigate 
or exacerbate an expressive signal from the granting of a patent.  For example, because Hamer is 
sympathetic to gay and lesbian causes, arguably his obtaining a patent on the gay gene would not 
deliver as harsh of an expressive impact.  In contrast, if someone from NARTH, a group of 
psychiatrists who still view homosexuality as a pathological disorder, were to discover a gay 
198 Id.
199 Id.  
200 One possible variation would be to strike references in the patent to the gene’s role in 
sexual orientation.  Such a change would be recorded in the prosecution history of the patent and 
could thus express the alternative message – that the government via the PTO does not view 
genes on non-pathological conditions as worthy of patent protection in any shape or form.  
Admittedly, the patent would still give protection to the gene, regardless of how it is being used, 
but the government act of striking the utility vis-à-vis sexual orientation would communicate an 
alternative message.  
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gene, the expressive impact could be even more harmful.  The motivation behind the inventor’s 
technology would differ, and the resulting communication from the patenting of the technology 
could vary depending on the inventor’s intent behind developing it.  
Overall, inventor identity likely would not have a significant impact on the strength of the 
signal.  The expressive theory articulated here suggests the harm is originated by the 
government’s grant of the patent.  As such, the identity of the inventor may not matter—the 
government has expressed its view that a gay gene  satisfies the utility requirement, 
notwithstanding its relative nature.  The mere existence of the patent emphasizes the view of 
gay-as-pathology.  Moreover, the inventor’s interest in keeping the invention out of unscrupulous 
hands is almost impossible to maintain.  She may have the right to exclude others, but the 
information surrounding her invention is disclosed to the public.  Indeed, once the patent has 
expired, anyone can use this information, including NARTH.  The inventor’s lack of control over 
the information, and eventually the invention itself, also suggests that the identity of the inventor 
may not have a significant effect on the expressive impact.
In fact, it is likely that the identity of the inventor will be irrelevant to the gay and lesbian 
community:
In addition, the fact that the current wave of scientists working in the area are either 
themselves, or are well disposed to gay people, tends to diminish anxiety that the 
research is intended to harm the gay community.  Nevertheless, some gays and 
lesbians still express fear that science is likely to harm them, whatever the sympathies 
of the scientists themselves.201
Thus, the identity of the inventor or owner would have little bearing on the expressive harm 
resulting from the grant of the patent.  
201 LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 147.
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5. The Nature of the Characteristic at Issue
The potential for expressive harms from patents will also depend on how closely the 
behavior or condition is associated with a person’s identity.  For homosexuals, generally the link 
between their orientation and their identity is strong and intimate.  Similarly, other conditions 
where the link between behavior/condition and identity are strong could include the deaf and 
dwarfism, where these communities do not view their condition as necessarily pathological or in 
need of curing.  Other conditions may not have as strong of a link to identity.  A patent on 
aggression, for example, would not generate an expressive harm because most people to not 
define themselves as an individual through their aggressiveness.  Other possible conditions –
such as obesity – might fall somewhere in the middle of the identity spectrum.  At some point, 
though, such as discovery genes that affect certain ethnic groups more particularly, the 
significant impact of the disease may outweigh expressive consequences of the patent itself.  In 
fact, concepts of race and ethnic origin may become more strongly implicated as exploration of 
genetic differences between people continue.  
C. Assessing the Potential for Expressive Harms from Patents
As genetic and biological research shifts away from conditions that are indisputably 
pathological, patents in this area will increasingly bear on what is considered to be good, 
particularly due to patent laws utility requirement.  The above analysis shows that there is 
considerable potential for expressive harms to result from the granting of patents in these 
controversial areas.  As with any sort of signal, the strength of the signal may vary.202  The fact 
that signal strength may vary, though, does not undermine the fact that the signal exists.  There 
almost certainly will be some sort of message of inferiority or pathology communicated to the 
groups impacted by these technological developments.  The message is that the government, 
202 Cf. Long, supra note 7, at 660-63 (discussing noise in signal to investors).  
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through the grant of a patent, believes that technologies that may help eliminate these conditions, 
and therefore these groups, is normatively good.  In essence, the government is approving 
privatized eugenics.  
IV. PRESCRIPTIVE OPTIONS TO REMEDY THESE EXPRESSIVE CONSEQUENCES
While expressive harms in patent law likely will occur, the mere presence of a harm does 
not mean necessarily that we should deny patent protection in these contexts.  The harms are a 
cost – albeit a non-economic one203 – that would need to be weighed against other potential 
benefits.  In some contexts, such as sexual orientation, the benefit of any patent seems low, while 
expressive harm seems high.  If the risk of expressive harm is viewed as significant, we must 
explore other options to eliminate that harm.  For the blind, deaf, dwarfs, and autistics, the reality 
very well may be that the agnostic approach of “granting both” likely will not come to pass.  
This Section of the article will explore possible means to address the potential expressive impact 
of patents, evaluating the benefits and downsides to each approach.  As this section will show, 
none of the solutions are perfect and each imposes its own consequences.
A. Do Nothing – Maintain the Status Quo Neutral Approach Towards Morality
The most obvious option would be to do nothing.  It might very well be that the cost 
imposed by the expressive harm is not sufficient to require an alteration to the patent system in 
any significant way.  The various factors above demonstrate that, while communication of a 
message is likely, the strength of that signal may be contingent on numerous factors.  As such, 
the communication may be so muted as to not merit changing the status quo.  If the Patent Office 
maintains its agnostic approach and would allow patents for both conversions from gay-to-
203 Cf. id. at 100 (“Utilitarians seldom take into account more subtle benefits and harms that 
cannot be easily measured, or which accrue to the soul rather than to the body.”).  
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straight or straight-to-gay, then the expressive impact would be significantly reduced.  If, 
however, the Patent Office does not treat both as equal, as likely would be the case in the context 
of the blind, deaf, or autistics, then the message would be fairly strong.  Maintaining a truly 
morally neutral approach, and not discriminating on the technology, would be key to minimizing 
the expressive harm and therefore requiring no change in policy.
Patents on inventions that some find objectionable seemingly have not created significant 
moral expressions in the past.  For example, there are patents on methods of performing 
abortions, which clearly would implicate messages of the government embracing certain 
technologies.204  Admittedly, these inventions are not directly related to identity the way that 
patents on sexual orientation or other behaviors may be, but the argument would be that society 
has weathered patents on controversial technologies previously and can continue to do so.  The 
burden of fleshing out those technologies that are creating such a harm is not worth the cost.  
B. Cease Issuing Patents on Human Genes and Gene Fragments
If one concludes, however, that the harm inflicted on these groups is significant and 
should be addressed, one approach would be to deny patents on all inventions that relate to 
human genes.  Others have called for a similar ban because patents inhibit innovation205 or that 
genes are naturally occurring substances ineligible for patent protection.206  The potential for 
expressive consequences adds another basis for objecting to these types of patents.
This approach, however, is both over- and under-inclusive in resolving the possibility of 
expressive harms.  A complete ban on gene patents would eliminate protection not only for those 
204 See Thomas, supra note 149, at 5801-81.  Professor Thomas views these patents as 
privatized regulation that deny access to these technologies, but the grant of the patent could 
signify government endorsement of the technique as well.  
205 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 698.
206 See generally Demaine and Fellmeth, supra note 177.
54
patents with the potential for an expressive harm but also those that are genuinely directed to 
conditions that need to be cured, such as various cancers or schizophrenia.  A complete ban 
would thus be an overly inclusive solution, and indeed might create more harm than good by 
eliminating the patent incentive for research into areas that undeniably relate to pathological 
conditions.
A ban, moreover, would be underinclusive.  As the discussion of the biology of 
homosexuality demonstrated, many behavioral characteristics may not be genetically determined
but instead may be influenced by non-genetic, biological situations, such as in utero hormone 
levels.  The burgeoning field of proteomics further shows that the expression of a trait may be 
controlled not only at the genetic level but also at the protein level.  A ban on gene patents alone, 
therefore, still permit patents on various proteins and biological processes, which still has the 
potential to create an expressive harm.  Moreover, methods of curing would also seem to escape 
a proscription on gene patents.  Thus, while the potential expressive harms from patents adds 
some additional support to recent calls to stop granting patents on human genes and gene 
fragments, this approach would not adequately solve the problem. 
C. Allow the PTO to Assess Whether the Expressive Impact Outweighs Benefits of 
Granting the Patent
Another possibility would be to allow the PTO or the courts to assess the expressive 
impact of a patent in assessing the patent’s validity.  The PTO would seem to be on the front 
lines, as they will first encounter these patents with expressive or eugenic potential.  Examiners, 
however, are persons with technical skills and not necessarily ethical training.  They would be 
ill-equipped to grapple with the ethical assessments that these applications may present.  The 
PTO could establish an ethics board to deal with these issues or other morally questionable 
inventions. While not a panacea, examiners could flag inventions that raise expressive potential, 
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which could be reviewed by such a board.  The board, to avoid the appearance of bias, could be 
formed of persons not employed by the PTO directly.  
Of course, ironically, in trying to assess any potential expressive impact from a given 
patent, the PTO would be memorializing and in fact confirming an expressive consideration of 
patent law.  The PTO would be saying “yes, we view this as lacking utility or having utility” 
with consideration for expressive harms.  This solution could prove to be worse than the 
problem.
The courts could also reinvigorate the now-moribund morality exclusion, and allow for 
consideration of expressive harms.  The courts, however, may not be in the best position to make 
such assessments.  Indeed, given that the groups who are likely harmed by some patents would 
likely never be infringers themselves, obtaining standing to challenge such patents would be a 
problem.   
D. Define “Utility” as Covering Genes and Biological Processes Relating to 
Pathological Conditions—Patents for Therapy, not Enhancement
A cleaner, morally neutral approach would for there to be a change in the utility standard, 
either pursuant to Congress or the PTO.  An invention relating to human biology would have 
utility only if it served to identify or correct a truly pathological condition.  While on the margins 
of what constitutes “pathological” could create some difficulty, such a condition would could be 
tied to the medical professions views of what is viewed as disease or pathology.  Moral 
considerations would be minimized, and those inventions that relate more to behavior and or 
identity would be excluded from patent protection.
A potential source for identifying what constitutes “pathological” would be the medical 
community.  Psychiatrists and psychologists, for example, use the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in assessing whether a patient has a pathological mental 
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health condition.207  Thus, the DSM acts as a catalog of conditions that are viewed as 
pathological, and those that are not.  Thus, the field of medicine, and particularly the DSM, 
would be a helpful tool in assessing whether a condition is pathological and therefore should be 
eligible for patent protection.  This approach could also be articulated as the “therapy versus 
enhancement” approach – protection will be provided for those genetic and biological inventions 
that relate to therapies for diseases but not for mere enhancements.208
There are also problems with this approach.  The line therapy/pathology and enhancement line is 
far from clear.  The DSM itself has proven to be a fluid reference – it has changed over time, and 
conditions within it continually change.  For example, the DSM lists Attention deficit-
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as a disease and prescribes the use of drugs to treat this 
condition.209  But this pathology is recognized only by its symptoms, which are arguably simply 
the tail end of a normal distribution of attention levels of children.210  Arguably, this is not a case 
of using drugs to cure a pathology – a therapy – but instead to enhance the attention level of 
individuals.211
What constitutes pathological is often infected by social and cultural norms, not simply 
medical knowledge.  The most obvious example is homosexuality itself.  As discussed above, 
until the early 1970s, the medical community, with considerable internal debate, did consider 
homosexuality to be pathological.  Nothing changed in the 1970s with respect to homosexuality 
207 See FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 47; ALLEN, supra note 34, at 244 (noting that the DSM is 
“the psychiatric profession’s handbook of recognized pathological behaviors”).  The DSM is 
currently in its 4th edition, and is referred to as the DSM-IV.
208 FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 208-09; see also Markwood, supra note 24, at 478-82 
(discussing regulation of enhancement technologies).  
209 Id. at 47.
210 Id. at 47.
211 Id. at 49 (“To classify people in this situation as suffering from a pathology is therefore to 
blur the line between therapy and enhancement.  Yet this is exactly the demand that proponents 
of the medicalization of ADHD have made.”).
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– instead social norms and views of homosexuals changed with in the medical community, 
resulting in it being eliminated as a pathological condition.212  The contextual nature of 
psychological disorders, therefore, may result in an ever-moving target of what constitutes 
pathological.
The  medical line of therapy/enhancement could truly break down in the context of the 
deaf, dwarfs, and high-functioning autistics.  The deaf do not view themselves as medically 
pathological, although the hearing community would view them as lacking one of the key human 
senses and, thus, possessing a pathological condition.  The medical community would seem to be 
more in line with that of the hearing community, risking that the use of a medical norm would 
allow patents that arguably would express disfavor to the deaf community.  A similar argument 
could be made for dwarfs, who have bodies that function entirely normally.  They are simply 
statistically far outside the normal range of human height.  High- functioning autistics can view 
themselves as simply having different social skills, which is not inherently wrong.  Arguably, 
this should not be viewed as a pathological condition, but likely the medical community would 
disagree.  
Simply because these distinctions are difficult to make, however, does not inevitably 
mean that we should allow everything to be patented.  Regulatory agencies other than the PTO 
are charged with making this distinction already.213  The PTO could be require the demonstration 
of a utility that is beyond mere enhancement and one that instead is a therapy directed to a 
known pathology.  The DSM could remain an effective tool, however.  While on the margins 
some conditions may seem close to the line of pathology, there are some conditions that 
212 Id. at 209.
213 Id. at 210-11.
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universally would be viewed as pathological, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.  The 
DSM would at least provide certainty for certain behaviors.
Currently there is no legal basis for limiting the pathological/enhancement distinction to 
gene-related, biological-related, or behaviorally-related inventions.  Indeed, under international 
obligations, countries must not discriminate on the basis of technological area, other than the 
exceptions provided for in TRIPS.214  Consequently, the redefinition of utility would apply in 
other contexts, including to basic pharmaceuticals.  Patent protection for things like Viagra or 
Claritin might not be eligible for patent protection under the therapy/enhancement dichotomy.  
Whether this possibility is good or bad as a policy matter, however, bears further exploration.
The pharmaceutical industry has come under criticism recently for failing to devote 
sufficient resources to particularly relevant drugs, instead focusing on the next generation of 
market-driven (as opposed to health-care driven) drugs such as antihistamines.  A recent study 
has shown that most new drugs entering the market are not particularly innovative and instead 
are simply follow-on improvements on already existing drugs.215  There are a number of reasons 
for this reality: the dependency on drug companies on blockbuster drugs;216 the ability of 
companies to extend patent protection effectively on blockbusters through patent and FDA laws 
and regulations;217 and the reduced cost of relying on known drugs in proving safety and 
efficacy.218  Innovation in the pharmaceutical market thus seems anchored to existing drugs, 
many of which are more driven towards enhancement as opposed to curing pathologies.
214 TRIPS, art. 27(1).
215 Michie Hunt, CHANGING PATTERNS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 3 (2002) (report 
by National Institute for Health Care Management Research and Educational Foundation).  
216 Id. at 16.
217 Id. at 16-18.
218 Id. at 16.
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A new utility standard, therefore, would reduce incentives for companies to spend money 
on “lifestyle” drugs and instead create greater incentive for pharmaceuticals and other companies 
to research drugs and biologics directed to more severe conditions.  With availability of patents 
curtailed, companies would not have the patent rights to recoup their sunk research and 
development costs.  The ex ante incentive to research drugs that deal with lifestyle would 
therefore be dramatically reduced, affording the opportunity for drug companies to shift greater 
resources to finding cures to truly pathological conditions.  Less money would be spent on the 
next generation of Viagra and hopefully more would be spent trying to find vaccines for 
AIDS.219
V. CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated the real potential for expressive harms to marginalized 
biologically-defined groups, where the patent communicates that these biological conditions are 
in fact pathological instead merely a form of diversity within the human race.  There are a variety 
of options presented to deal with this concern, but all of them have there advantages and 
difficulties.  None perfectly solves the problem.  At a minimum, this article calls for a 
reconsideration of what we mean by “useful” in patent law.
In fact, the ultimate utility that we may be protecting is that of choice – allowing persons 
to determine how best to use these technologies.  But falling back on choice does not answer the 
question of why the government should be involved in granting patent rights for these 
discoveries.  Choice alone as purely a “good” is quite debatable in the context of privatized 
219 Given the markets for such “lifestyle drugs,” however, it seems unlikely that all research 
into these areas would completely dry up without patent protection.
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eugenics, which the patent system is poised to incentivize.220  The right to choose may 
accompany a considerable cost – elimination of groups considered outside the norm.221  While 
the regulation of this choice undeniably lies outside of the patent system,222 that system need not 
embrace destructive choices by allocating a given technology as “useful” regardless of the harm 
that invention might inflict.  The government should not be facilitating such activities with the 
patent system.
The patent system is one of incentives – if an inventor will engage in research resulting in 
a patentable invention, she is rewarded with the patent’s period of exclusivity, which allows the 
inventor to recoup her sunk costs and preventing free-riding by competitors.  There is no doubt 
that denying patents in this area will not stop research into such technologies – other public   
measures would be required.223  Eliminating, or modifying the availability of, patent rights in 
these areas would at least help to mitigate these commercial interests and make such innovations 
220 FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 100 (“[W]e should be skeptical of libertarian arguments 
that say that as long as eugenic choices are being bade my individuals rather than by states, we 
needn’t worry about possible bad consequences.  Free markets work well much of the time, but 
there are also market failures that require government intervention to correct.  Negative 
externalities do not simply take care of themselves.”); HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 
14, at 302 (“How will we distinguish ‘good’ genes from ‘bad’?  What traits will be valued and 
what will be discarded? Who gets to choose?”).  
221 Of course, the ultimate result of genetic research could be that everyone has some sort of 
genetic predisposition, so that “the ‘normal’ population may be reduced to the point at which 
genetic discrimination becomes unfeasible.” Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 14, at 337.  There 
may remain certain traits, particularly those close to identity, that may be given greater weight 
over others that do not implicate personhood concerns.  
222 See Dresser, supra note 164, at 424-31 (recognizing that “fears expressed about animal 
patenting fail to apply to patenting alone; instead, they bear on the broader issue of whether 
scientists should be permitted to manipulate higher animal life at all” and addressing possible 
regulations without the patent system).  
223 Others have already called for public regulation on biotechnology.  See FUKUYAMA, 
supra note 15, at 10 & 182 (2002).  There may be reason to doubt, of course, whether such 
regulation would limit the use of tests to assess homosexuality.  See Schüklenk, supra note 197
(“Indeed, why should we assume that legislators in homophobic societies would regulate the use 
of such devices in the first place?”). 
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less desirable.  Regardless, though, do we really want the patent system – with the approbation of 
a government-granted right – to incentivize the creation of inventions with such powerful 
expressive harms and enormous eugenic potential?  Simply because denying patent protection 
will not stop these technologies does not mean that we should, therefore, continue to grant these
patents and create incentives for harmful and potentially destructive discoveries.224
224 Cf. FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 10(“The fact that there are some individuals or 
organizations that violate these rules, or that there are countries, where the rules are either 
nonexistent or poorly enforced, is no excuse for not making the rules in the first place.  People 
get away with robbery and murder, after all, which is not a reason to legalize theft and 
homicide.”).  
